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This video breaks down how Anders Antonsen managed to defeat prime Kento Momota at the 2019 Indonesia Masters and why it only happened once. We analyze Momota’s control-based system, Antonsen’s aggressive adjustments, and how drifty conditions can change the dynamics of a match. By comparing this with their 2019 World Championship final, we reveal how court conditions, shot selection, and tempo impact elite badminton strategy. If you want to understand high-level tactics, rally control, and how top players adapt, this breakdown gives you a deeper look into what really decides matches at the highest level.
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0:00
Out of the matches, Anders Antonsen
0:01
played against Kento Momota, he lost
0:03
every one except one.
0:06
At the 2019 Indonesia Masters,
0:09
Anders Antonsen beat world number one
0:11
Kento Momota in his prime.
0:13
And this was an upset that gave hope for
0:15
other players to beat Momota as well.
0:18
That there was a way to beat Momota if
0:19
you played the right tactics.
0:24
But perhaps it was a sort of false hope
0:27
as Antonsen wouldn't ever repeat the
0:28
same feat of taking down Momota.
0:32
Was this just a fluke?
0:34
If Antonsen couldn't repeat this
0:35
performance,
0:36
what actually made this match different?
0:39
In this video, we're going to break down
0:41
the strategy,
0:43
the conditions, and why this win only
0:46
worked once.
0:48
To dive into this match's breakdown,
0:50
we need to establish both players' games
0:52
and styles.
0:54
Momota's game is built on control.
0:57
He plays high-quality shots that force
0:59
pressure on his opponents, and when they
1:01
get impatient, he punishes their
1:03
mistakes.
1:06
Take his pushes, for example.
1:09
They are often played at a speed and
1:10
height
1:12
where the opponent is forced into one of
1:14
two options.
1:15
Either they can jump out and attack the
1:17
shuttle,
1:19
or they can take the late forehand or
1:21
late backhand.
1:24
Both of these options benefit Momota's
1:25
game.
1:26
The first forces his opponent to expend
1:28
more energy, and the second puts Momota
1:31
in a stronger position in the rally.
1:34
What these pushes are often good at is
1:37
preventing his opponents from getting
1:38
their attack going.
1:40
The less they can score with their
1:41
attack, the more impatient they get, and
1:44
ultimately force shots that Momota will
1:47
punish.
1:56
Today, Antonsen is known more for his
1:57
control,
1:59
where he relies on half smashes and
2:01
follow-ups that allow him to take the
2:03
net early.
2:04
But in 2019, he was much more aggressive
2:06
and willing to take high-risk shots.
2:09
He would often take gambles like full
2:11
smashing and fully committing to the
2:13
follow-up.
2:14
And on paper,
2:16
when you match these two styles against
2:17
each other, Momota's style should always
2:19
come out on top.
2:21
Because what Momota is good at is
2:23
neutralizing these aggressive high-risk
2:24
shots
2:26
with excellent push and lift quality.
2:29
This usually makes aggressive players
2:30
impatient
2:32
and leads them to force these risky
2:34
shots,
2:35
leading into unforced errors,
2:37
or bad shot selection,
2:39
which is what happened for the most
2:41
part.
2:42
So then the question is, what made this
2:44
match any different from the rest?
2:47
To determine what made this match
2:48
different,
2:50
we first need to look at the court
2:51
conditions.
2:52
Drift plays a huge role in the flight
2:55
path of a shuttle.
2:57
And in the Istora Senayan, a stadium
2:59
known to be extremely fast and drifty,
3:02
you can expect there to be deviations
3:04
from a shuttle's normal flight path.
3:09
The drift we want to focus on in this
3:10
match is mainly the front-to-back drift.
3:14
In this match,
3:15
the drift blows from the nearest side to
3:18
the furthest side,
3:20
which means that the player on the
3:21
nearest side to the screen is the one
3:24
playing with the drift.
3:25
The ones playing with the drift will
3:27
have a much harder time playing towards
3:29
the baseline.
3:30
So in order to not hit the shuttle out,
3:32
they need to adjust their swings.
3:35
What this does is reduce the shot speed
3:37
on these shots towards the baseline by
3:39
forcing the player to play them with a
3:41
less explosive swing.
3:45
The shot speed of a shot can be
3:46
attributed to how fast the shuttle is
3:48
initially flying off the strings,
3:50
because that is the part when your
3:52
opponent must react. The faster and more
3:55
explosively the shuttle flies off the
3:56
strings, the less time your opponent
3:58
has.
4:00
And you can see in both players, the
4:02
moment they add power behind their swing
4:05
in these pushes or clears,
4:07
the shuttle goes out.
4:11
Consequently, players will have to
4:13
change the way they play depending on
4:14
which side they're on,
4:16
which Antonsen was fully ready to take
4:18
advantage of.
4:19
In the first set, you can see Antonsen
4:22
positioning his base a lot higher on the
4:24
court
4:25
because he knows that it's difficult for
4:27
Momota to control the shots to the
4:29
baseline.
4:30
And generally, when the shot is
4:32
difficult to control, you're not
4:34
gravitating to play it. Naturally,
4:36
you're going to try to play the shot
4:38
that is less risky.
4:48
On top of this, there's also the shot
4:49
speed that we mentioned before.
4:51
Drift doesn't meaningfully affect the
4:53
shuttle at contact, but influences
4:55
heavily when the shuttle is in flight,
4:58
changing how far it travels more than
4:59
how fast it moves.
5:01
For Momota to control the lift, he has
5:04
to take speed away from his swing,
5:07
making the shuttle slower initially,
5:09
which gives Antonsen more time to react,
5:12
turn, and attack.
5:16
Another interesting thing Antonsen does
5:18
in this match is he keeps the shuttle
5:19
predominantly on Momota's forehand side.
5:30
Now, there are a couple of reasons for
5:31
this. First, Momota's around-the-head in
5:33
the back court is one of his most
5:34
dangerous weapons.
5:36
From that position, he can generate
5:37
really steep angles
5:39
and apply a lot of pressure
5:40
even without hitting full power.
5:48
So by keeping the shuttle away from that
5:49
side, Antonsen is taking away one of
5:51
Momota's biggest attacking threats.
5:54
The second reason is a bit more subtle.
5:56
Compared to his backhand side,
5:59
Momota's forehand is just slightly more
6:00
predictable both in the front court and
6:02
the back court.
6:04
His backhand front court in particular
6:05
has a lot more deception.
6:08
He has his signature shot where he
6:10
changes the racket face at the last
6:12
second to change the direction of the
6:14
shuttle, but also an extremely deceptive
6:16
hold and push from his backhand side
6:20
when he takes the shuttle early.
6:23
Whereas on the forehand side in both the
6:25
front court and back court, those
6:28
options are a bit more straightforward.
6:31
Majority of the time,
6:33
Momota's late forehand is a straight
6:35
drop,
6:36
which isn't a problem if one, the shot
6:38
quality is good,
6:40
and two, if he can threaten the back
6:42
court as well with a clear.
6:44
And in a slower hall,
6:47
Momota would have more time in control,
6:49
which allows him to vary his shots
6:52
and break out of these patterns.
6:54
But in Istora Senayan,
6:56
with the drift and the speed,
6:58
the clear becomes unfeasible as playing
7:01
to the back court with the drift is
7:03
extremely difficult.
7:05
Instead of having full variation, he's a
7:07
bit more restricted in what he can
7:08
safely play.
7:10
Knowing this,
7:12
Antonsen would actively look to
7:13
anticipate Momota's straight drops from
7:15
his forehand side.
7:21
So now we know what Antonsen does when
7:23
he plays against the drift.
7:25
But what about when he switches sides
7:27
and plays with the drift?
7:28
This proved extremely difficult for him
7:31
as he immediately made around seven
7:32
unforced errors.
7:39
After making seven quick errors,
7:42
the question then becomes whether you
7:43
want to try to play for a comeback in
7:45
this scenario, or conserve your energy
7:48
for the third. In this case, Antonsen
7:50
probably chose the latter, but it's
7:52
important that he doesn't completely
7:54
bomb out the second set,
7:56
and instead
7:58
tries to find some feeling in his game,
8:00
especially on his shots to the back
8:02
court,
8:03
or in the style that he's going to play
8:05
on that side.
8:07
Thus, in the second half of the third
8:09
set, when they ultimately switch sides,
8:12
Antonsen doesn't need to spend crucial
8:14
rallies trying to find his touch on the
8:15
side with the drift.
8:18
It's important that Antonsen actually
8:20
has a lead here so that there is
8:22
pressure on Momota to catch back up and
8:25
score.
8:26
And when there's more pressure,
8:28
it often is the case that the athlete
8:30
cannot think as well.
8:32
When you're chasing the score, your
8:34
focus naturally shifts.
8:36
Instead of looking to disrupt your
8:38
opponent,
8:39
you start prioritizing consistency,
8:42
playing safer, more familiar shots, and
8:44
trying not to make mistakes. And that
8:47
plays right into Antonsen's hands
8:48
because he has more freedom to take
8:50
risks
8:51
like hard committing to shot combos.
8:55
It only takes a couple of these to go in
8:57
the right direction
8:58
to completely swing the momentum in
9:00
Antonsen's favor, which is ultimately
9:02
what happened, and he ran with it until
9:05
the end of the game.
9:10
We've talked about what happens to both
9:12
players' games in these drifty
9:13
conditions, but we also think it's
9:15
important to look at what happens when
9:17
the conditions play more in Momota's
9:19
favor.
9:20
A perfect example of this is their next
9:21
meeting at the 2019 World Championship
9:24
Finals. This is quite a famous game, and
9:27
many know this as probably the most
9:29
one-sided World Championship Finals to
9:30
ever be played.
9:32
But what actually happened here?
9:34
The arena was much slower compared to
9:36
that of the Istora Senayan,
9:38
and because of that, players can control
9:40
their depth on their shots to the back
9:42
much better.
9:43
And why that benefited Momota more than
9:46
Antonsen was that Momota wasn't forced
9:47
into Antonsen's rhythm because he could
9:50
simply neutralize any attempts that
9:51
Antonsen would have made to change the
9:53
rhythm.
9:55
This is especially apparent in Momota's
9:56
defense,
9:57
where it was not only easier to defend
10:00
because the venue was slower,
10:02
but also because he was able to control
10:04
his shots all the way to the back. And
10:06
evidently, this made Antonsen extremely
10:08
frustrated.
10:09
Starting at 12 to 8 in the second half
10:11
of the first set,
10:12
Antonsen made seven unforced errors,
10:16
meaning that of the nine points Momota
10:17
needed to win, seven were unforced by
10:20
Antonsen.
10:23
And it didn't stop there.
10:25
Of the 21 points Momota needed to win in
10:27
the second set, 13 of them were unforced
10:30
from Antonsen.
10:32
This just goes to show how much the
10:34
conditions can shape the outcome of a
10:35
match.
10:37
Because when the game was played in
10:38
Istora Senayan,
10:40
Antonsen was able to force the pace,
10:42
limit Momota's options,
10:44
and play in a way that made his
10:46
aggression effective. But the moment
10:48
those conditions changed,
10:50
and the court conditions were much
10:51
slower,
10:52
everything changed.
10:54
Momota could comfortably control his
10:56
shots to his high degree of shot
10:57
quality.
10:59
He could reset the rally, so instead of
11:00
being forced into uncomfortable
11:02
positions,
11:03
he was the one putting pressure on
11:04
Antonsen to try and force something.
11:07
And over time, that pressure turns into
11:09
mistakes.
11:13
At the 2019 Indonesia Masters,
11:16
Antonsen didn't suddenly become the
11:17
better player.
11:19
He just found a way to play a game that
11:20
Momota couldn't fully respond to in that
11:22
environment.
11:23
It'll be interesting to see if players
11:25
can consistently recreate something like
11:26
this, especially if the 3 by 15 point
11:29
system gets passed.
11:31
Can you force a faster tempo against a
11:32
control player like Momota under the
11:34
right conditions? Or is this something
11:36
that only works in very specific
11:37
situations? Let us know what you think
11:39
in the comments below.
11:41
If you enjoyed the video, be sure to hit
11:43
the like and subscribe button so you
11:45
don't miss out on future content.
11:47
And as always,
11:49
thanks for watching.
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