0:04
Russia has once again brought global
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attention to its strategic missile
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arsenal after another high-profile test
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of the RS28 Sarmat intercontinental
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ballistic missile commonly referred to
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in Western media as Satan 2. The missile
0:20
was referred to as the most powerful
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missile system in the world by President
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Vladimir Putin who asserted that it
0:27
could overcome all current and
0:28
prospective missile defense systems.
0:32
The Sarmat is not just another
0:34
intercontinental ballistic missile. It
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embodies a strategic deterrence
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philosophy that is distinctively
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Russian, characterized by its extreme
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range, huge throw weight, flexible
0:45
warhead configurations, and capacity to
0:48
attack from unconventional trajectories.
0:51
The United States and China are
0:53
currently in the process of quickly
0:55
modernizing their respective nuclear
0:59
However, Russia's Sarmat is in a
1:01
category that neither Washington nor
1:03
Beijing can directly match. A reality
1:06
that deeply interests the altitude
1:10
To understand where we are, we have to
1:12
look back at the Sarmat program's
1:13
inception where NATO refers to the
1:16
Soviet era R36 M2 Voyota missile as the
1:19
S18 Satan. The RS28 Sarmat was developed
1:24
to replace it. Designed during the Cold
1:27
War to guarantee that the Soviet Union
1:29
could retaliate with overwhelming force
1:32
even after a devastating first strike,
1:35
the original SS18 was one of the
1:37
heaviest and most destructive nuclear
1:40
missiles ever built. Following the
1:42
collapse of the Soviet Union, many of
1:44
those missiles remained operational but
1:47
increasingly obsolete.
1:50
To preserve the concept of a superheavy
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strategic missile while incorporating
1:54
contemporary propulsion guidance and
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penetration technologies, Russia
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initiated the Sarmat program. The Makyv
2:02
rocket design bureau developed the
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missile which was later manufactured
2:06
with the assistance of many significant
2:09
Russian defense enterprises.
2:12
So basically this thing is a giant
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flying tank of liquid fuel. While most
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countries now use solid fuel because
2:19
it's easier to store and doesn't rot
2:22
your hardware, Russia stuck with the
2:24
liquid stuff because it gives them more
2:26
oomph and lets the missile carry more
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junk. It's complicated and a total
2:32
headache to maintain, but for Russia,
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the trade-off for that massive power
2:37
seems worth the trouble.
2:39
This focus on power brings us to the
2:41
Sarmat's fundamental technology. As the
2:44
missile is a three-stage liquidfueled
2:47
intercontinental ballistic missile that
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weighs over 200 tons at its core, its
2:53
range is estimated to be between 10,000
2:55
and 18,000 km. Although Russian
2:59
officials have asserted an even greater
3:01
suborbital reach, the missile's launch
3:04
weight is its unique feature, which is
3:06
the weight of the payload it can carry
3:08
over intercontinental distances.
3:12
Sarmat is capable of delivering an
3:14
estimated 10 tons of payload, which is
3:16
considerably more than the payload
3:18
capacity of the majority of modern
3:20
ICBMS. According to Altitude Addicts,
3:24
this massive payload capacity enables
3:26
several strategic options.
3:29
First, the missile is capable of
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delivering multiple independently
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targetable re-entry vehicles, which are
3:35
commonly referred to as MIRVS.
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Each warhead has the capacity to impact
3:41
an individual target that is located
3:43
hundreds of kilometers away.
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In theory, a single Sarmat launch could
3:48
simultaneously pose a threat to multiple
3:50
cities, military bases, or command
3:54
Secondly, it is stated that Sarmat is
3:56
capable of deploying hypersonic glide
3:59
vehicles, including the Avanguard
4:01
system. Hypersonic glide vehicles
4:04
operate at incredibly high speeds during
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atmospheric re-entry, which renders
4:09
interception significantly more
4:11
challenging than traditional ballistic
4:13
warheads that adhere to predictable
4:17
Third, the missile is capable of
4:19
carrying decoys and penetration aids
4:21
that are intended to confuse missile
4:25
These consist of radar decoys,
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electronic countermeasures, and bogus
4:30
targets that are designed to overwhelm
4:32
defensive interceptors.
4:34
Now, you might wonder why Russia still
4:37
prefers heavy liquidfueled missiles when
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solid fuel missiles are becoming the
4:41
preferred choice of most modern nuclear
4:44
powers. This is due to their ease of
4:47
storage, rapidity of launch, and
4:51
For instance, the United States is
4:53
heavily dependent on the solid fuel
4:56
Minute Man 3 system and its upcoming
4:58
successor, the Sentinel.
5:00
Russia, on the other hand, continues to
5:03
prioritize heavy liquidfueled missiles
5:05
due to strategic doctrine and geography.
5:09
For many years, Russian military
5:11
strategists have harbored concerns
5:13
regarding the development of American
5:15
missile defense systems.
5:17
Moscow believes that smaller missiles
5:19
with fewer warheads may ultimately
5:22
become vulnerable to interception.
5:25
Sarmat and other heavy missiles address
5:27
this issue by overwhelming defenses with
5:30
their enormous payload volume.
5:33
Look, the bottom line is that a big
5:35
missile can carry a lot of tricks. It's
5:38
not just about the big boom. It's about
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throwing so many decoys and gadgets at a
5:43
radar that the defensive system just
5:47
Russian military types like to call it a
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missile defense killer because it's
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basically designed to be too much for
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anyone to handle at once.
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This overwhelming force plays directly
5:59
into the concept of fractional orbital
6:03
One of the most controversial features
6:05
associated with Sarmat is its reported
6:07
capability for FOBS type trajectories.
6:11
The North Pole is the shortest route
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between the United States and Russia,
6:15
which is why traditional ICBMs travel
6:18
over it. The missile defenses and early
6:21
warning radars of the United States are
6:23
highly optimized for this northern
6:27
The equation is altered by a FOBS style
6:30
attack, which enables the missile to
6:32
approach from unexpected directions such
6:34
as the South Pole. This results in a
6:37
reduction in warning time and
6:39
complicates radar surveillance.
6:41
Although altitude addicts disagree on
6:43
the practicality of such missions, the
6:46
capability itself is of strategic
6:48
significance because it compels
6:50
adversaries to defend against a variety
6:55
In recent years, China has also
6:57
conducted experiments with technologies
6:59
similar to orbital bombardment, which
7:02
has caused concern among US defense
7:05
Nevertheless, the operational system
7:08
associated with this concept that has
7:10
garnered the most attention is Russia's
7:14
This tactical flexibility is further
7:16
enhanced by the Avenguard connection.
7:19
When combined with the Avenguard
7:21
hypersonic glide vehicle, the Sarmat
7:23
becomes particularly hazardous.
7:26
Conventional ballistic warheads re-enter
7:28
the atmosphere in predictable
7:32
Missile defense systems compute these
7:34
trajectories and endeavor to intercept
7:36
them during the midcourse or terminal
7:40
That model is wholly changed by a
7:42
vanguard. The glide vehicle is launched
7:45
into near space by an ICBM and it
7:48
re-enters the atmosphere at hypersonic
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speeds that reportedly exceed Mach 20
7:55
Then it descends toward its objective
7:57
performing vertical and lateral
7:59
maneuvers. This maneuverability renders
8:02
trajectory prediction exceedingly
8:06
The current missile defense systems are
8:08
designed to be effective against
8:10
predictable ballistic trajectories
8:12
rather than atmospheric hypersonic
8:14
gliders that are engaged in evasive
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Russia regards this technology as its
8:21
response to the large investment in
8:23
missile defense architecture by the
8:25
United States over the course of several
8:29
So, you got to ask, how far behind is
8:33
Well, it depends on what part of the
8:35
rocket you're looking at. We don't
8:38
really build these super heavy missiles
8:40
anymore because we decided smaller, more
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accurate ones were the way to go. It's
8:46
like Russia is building a giant
8:48
sledgehammer while the US is working on
8:53
Looking closer at the specific
8:55
technology, the United States is
8:57
considerably behind Russia in terms of
8:59
missile size and payload capacity due to
9:02
the fact that Washington ended the
9:03
pursuit of superheavy ICBMs.
9:07
The future LGM35 Sentinel program
9:09
prioritizes precision, digital
9:11
modernization, survivability, and
9:13
reliability over large throw weight.
9:16
American strategy is increasingly
9:18
dependent on stealth bombers and
9:20
submarines to provide survivable
9:24
In contrast, Russia continues to
9:27
prioritize the development of massive
9:29
missiles that are situated in silos and
9:31
are capable of transporting substantial
9:33
warhead loads. Nevertheless, the United
9:37
States is the leader in a number of
9:39
other critical areas. The missile
9:42
guidance systems, satellite
9:43
infrastructure, early warning networks,
9:46
and nuclear command and control systems
9:48
of the United States are generally
9:50
regarded as more advanced and reliable.
9:54
In addition, the operational
9:55
capabilities of US solid fuel missile
9:58
technology are more advanced.
10:00
Furthermore, Russia is unable to match
10:03
the stealth and quietness of the US
10:05
Navy's Ohio class and the future
10:07
Colombia class ballistic missile
10:09
submarines, which serve as an
10:11
exceptionally survivable deterrent
10:13
force. Operational hypersonic deployment
10:17
is the most significant area in which
10:19
the United States may presently be
10:21
behind. Russia fielded Avanguard years
10:24
before the US deployed comparable
10:26
strategic hypersonic systems. Russia has
10:30
established an early technological and
10:32
political advantage in this field
10:35
despite the fact that Washington is
10:37
swiftly accelerating development
10:40
However, many Western observers warn
10:42
that Russian assertions regarding Sarmat
10:45
and Avanguard may be exaggerated for
10:47
strategic messaging purposes.
10:50
These global shifts also lead us to ask
10:53
what is the comparative status of China?
10:56
China occupies a midpoint between the
10:58
United States and Russia. Over the past
11:02
decade, the People's Liberation Army
11:04
Rocket Force has experienced massive
11:08
The DF-41 and the more recent DF-27 are
11:12
major developments in the strategic
11:14
missile capability of China. The DF-41
11:17
is a solid fuel ICBM that is highly
11:20
capable and has an extended range as
11:22
well as the ability to perform MIRV.
11:25
It is road mobile which enhances its
11:28
survivability in comparison to silobased
11:30
systems. Additionally, China is making
11:33
major investments in the development of
11:35
orbital bombardment concepts and
11:38
hypersonic technology.
11:40
American defense officials have
11:42
repeatedly expressed apprehension
11:44
regarding Chinese testing of hypersonic
11:48
Nevertheless, China does not presently
11:50
have an equivalent to Sarmat in terms of
11:53
raw size or payload.
11:55
A smaller deterrent force that
11:57
prioritized assured retaliation over an
12:00
overwhelming counterforce capability was
12:03
traditionally the focus of Chinese
12:06
Despite the rapid evolution of this
12:08
situation, Beijing still appears to
12:10
favor mobile solid fuel systems over
12:13
massive liquidfueled missiles.
12:15
Therefore, Russia maintains a unique
12:18
position with the Sarmat, a superheavy
12:20
strategic missile that is specifically
12:22
engineered to overwhelm missile defenses
12:25
by achieving payload saturation.
12:28
But let's get real for a second. There
12:30
is a huge question of reliability.
12:34
This program has had some pretty
12:35
embarrassing failures, like silos
12:38
literally blowing up during tests in
12:43
Turns out keeping a 200 ton tube of
12:46
corrosive chemicals ready to fire at a
12:48
moment's notice is actually really hard.
12:52
You have to wonder if they just want the
12:54
world to think it works because a scaryl
12:56
looking missile is sometimes just as
12:59
good as a working one for making people
13:03
This potential for theater over
13:05
substance is central to the future of
13:08
strategic deterrence.
13:10
The Sarmat program underscores a more
13:12
extensive transformation in global
13:14
nuclear strategy. The quantity of
13:17
warheads was the primary factor in
13:19
deterrence during the Cold War.
13:22
Currently, missile defense penetration
13:24
and survivability are of equal
13:28
Russia's response involves hypersonic
13:30
maneuverability and enormous payloads.
13:33
Stealth, submarines, network command
13:36
systems, and precision modernization are
13:39
the responses of the United States to
13:41
the challenges of the 21st century.
13:44
Mobility, rapid expansion, and
13:46
diversified strategic systems appear to
13:49
be China's response. The outcome is a
13:52
new strategic arms competition that is
13:54
increasingly preoccupied with the
13:56
development of sophisticated delivery
13:58
systems rather than merely the number of
14:03
Systems such as Sarmat are becoming
14:05
symbols of a renewed era of strategic
14:07
rivalry as the last significant USRussia
14:10
nuclear arms treaty framework is under
14:16
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