0:00
to ask, having heard everything you've given us so far, is what do you think would have
0:06
happened if you denied clearance? How would you have gone about that? What would the impact
0:15
of that be? Would it even be possible? So maybe this is the first time remembering back to the Chair's introduction where I can
0:24
abandon the civil servant's response of saying that's a hypothetical question. I think it would have been very difficult indeed
0:31
Mr Carden, I mean again if I can walk you back to the situation I came into the post in
0:38
we had been through all of these steps very publicly in which the Prime Minister's nominee had been put out there
0:45
to the public, announced, blessed by the King agreed by the US government, we were in receipt of
0:52
formal letters from Number 10 telling us to get on with it quickly we had engineered Agramont to arrive just before the inauguration as required by that original letter that been published as part of the Humble Address response
1:07
So I'm not trying to hide from your question, but I suppose all I can do is agree with the premise that against that backdrop
1:14
the Foreign Office saying, OK, but sorry, we can't grant him clearance, would have been a very, very difficult problem
1:21
And a difficult problem I would have been landing the Foreign Secretary with and the Prime Minister with
1:26
And of course, given the commentary of the last few days, I'm acutely conscious of that
1:30
And I've done the odd bit of what if-ery myself. But I suppose, just in case this is the thrust of your question, that was not what was on my mind as we took this decision
1:42
I have spent 25 years now just as a civil servant. About half of that period I've been in jobs that have an acute bearing on national security
1:54
I live and breathe this stuff possibly to a fault Mr Carden and I believe passionately that it one of the jobs of the civil service creatively flexibly to support ministers in protecting national security
2:07
That's what I wanted the team performing this assessment to feel, and that's the conversation that was going on in my head as I listened to their recommendations
2:16
And so if we go back again, the Cabinet Secretary at the time, Lord Case, advised the Prime Minister to carry out security vetting prior to announcing any appointment
2:29
Why would that advice not have been followed? Here I will take the civil servant's answer, if I may
2:38
It's a hypothetical I can't possibly have a bearing on. I wonder why it wouldn't have been automatically. If that was the view of the Civil Service
2:47
why wouldn't that advice just automatically be followed, that vetting would be gained
2:53
before an announcement made I can only guess I mean the Prime Minister had received a due diligence report in which the very well reputational risks of appointing Mandelson
3:10
were presumably made clear to him. He had advice on different options for the post
3:16
I assume he will have looked at the risks around Mandelson. And maybe he thought, look, this is a very well-known character
3:24
I'm making a risk judgment that his political skills and now in Washington is just what this country needs at this time
3:32
And he decided there's not much more that any process can tell me ahead of me making this announcement and making this appointment
3:40
Now, as I've said earlier, in response to questions, I hope that if I'd been in the system at the time those decisions were being made
3:48
first, I hope the number 10 in the Cabinet Office might have wanted to consult me
3:51
I don't think at the time the Foreign Office was consulted, and then I hope my advice would have been that's adding unnecessarily to your risk, Prime Minister
