WATCH: West Midlands Police say Maccabi Tel Aviv fan ban was to ‘protect the public’ during inquiry
Jan 6, 2026
West Midlands Police defended their decision to ban Maccabi Tel Aviv fans, saying intelligence and threat assessments had been reviewed in detail.Officials said open-source research and conversations with the Dutch police informed the risk assessment, alongside reports of local tensions and threats.The force stressed the ban was a precaution to protect the public, citing previous experience with high-risk fixtures.West Midlands Police acknowledged mistakes in sourcing some information but said overall the decision was based on a “reasonable position” from multiple intelligence streams.WATCH THE CLIP ABOVE FOR MORE
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0:00
The information, the intelligence that we received, that we documented
0:05
and we've shared absolutely all of that with HMICFRS very, very recently
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was all gone through. The mistake that was made in terms of the West Ham
0:17
was one individual doing one Google search because he couldn't find the other, he couldn't find the reference
0:25
because it wasn't there within the system. but can I, do you want to just answer that question
0:30
I've just got a couple of points just to try and help a little bit if possible so open source research is not unusual in police information and intelligence gathering
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and it's specifically called out in the public order public safety authorised professional practice as good practice
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to do online open source research so that is not unusual this was briefed into the first gold meeting very early on
0:51
and at that point from everything that I've read West Midlands Police were planning on receiving Maccabi Tel Aviv fans
0:57
so at that point the reference the almost the implication that that was um erroneously searched
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for to try and build evidence to justify it it's not a fair reflection of the reality the open source
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research is good practice it incorporates the broader understanding for your threat assessment
1:16
so the open source research was a mistake and that has been called out ai was not used just in
1:23
relation to the point you raise, forgive me, again, my understanding is, and I wasn't at the SAG
1:29
but my understanding from the SAG was that they discussed the full range of risks, and that
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included the risk from pro-Palestinian protests. So my understanding is that if you look at the
1:40
intelligence picture and the information developed over time, it was clear that there were people
1:45
locally who were very unhappy about Maccabi Tel Aviv coming to Birmingham, and that there were
1:50
threats and there was information intelligence of those threats. So we had the rising tide of
1:55
concern locally and then we had the additional information about Maccabi Tel Aviv and the
2:01
potential threat of them attacking community members as opposed to rival fans and those two
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things together I think presented a reasonable position for the police to say we want to protect
2:10
the public and this was about a reasonable decision to try to protect the public. Can I bring
2:16
It's a question specifically for Mr Roberts. We've heard a lot about Lord Mann's report
2:24
It's one quite concrete piece of research on the actual football team that we are discussing
2:31
When you received the report from Lord Mann, what did you do with it
2:36
First of all I will say I had a dialogue with Lord Mann over a number of years It always been a very positive dialogue I think he always comes from a motivated point of view of the fans perspective and that not just over the issues involving Israeli fans
2:51
particularly around disabled fans. He's a real champion, so I'll listen to Lord Man and we have a good dialogue
2:57
That said, in terms of the report, it was marked private and confidential
3:02
I made a number of attempts to try and arrange a meeting with him. There were two meetings arranged, and I offer no criticism
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he's a busy man and things happen and I understand there was a technology failure on at least one
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occasion but we never actually managed to speak despite a number of attempts to try and speak to
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him. As I offer it as no criticism because he speaks Lord Man a lot and I think he quite enjoys
3:21
speaking to me on occasions. When I look at his report and the relevance of it to the risk
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assessment process in this particular case the salient point and it's been brought out already
3:32
the distinction between intelligence and information the relevant intelligence in this was the
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narrative around what happened on the night with Amsterdam. That was superseded with first-hand evidence by West Midlands Police
3:45
speaking directly to the Dutch Police. The rest of it is a narrative
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and an opinion by Lord Mann, some of which I agree with, some of which
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I disagree with. So as such it would fall into the category of information
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so it wouldn't be something that I fed into the risk assessment process because I think the
4:01
relevant element was superseded, as I say, by the conversation with the Dutch National Police
4:05
Thank you. So on the intelligence gathering operation then, could you just give us a quick overview of other than the conversation that you had with the Dutch police and the Googling, what official documents you ysed that fed into your risk matrix
4:28
Yes, so because of the nature of the football fixture, and this is not normally the case for a normal football fixture, you wouldn't necessarily identify an intelligence bronze commander
4:39
So in effect, you have somebody who's an intelligence professional whose role is to collate and gather all sources of information and intelligence to help inform a threat assessment on behalf of the commander
4:50
That then comes by way of, I think it was a weekly sit rep, actually
4:53
I don't know whether that increased nearer to the fixture, but in effect the intelligence operatives create a document
5:00
that is considered by the gold and silver commanders within their meetings and the use of the national decision-making model
5:06
And that contains sensitive intelligence, intelligence flows from a range of sources
5:11
Specifically, what do you think was the kind of clincher other than the conversation that you had with the Dutch police
5:19
and the open AI I wouldn't say there was a clincher I think it was very clear from looking at the information intelligence flow and the feedback from community Let talk about this intelligence flow I just trying to get a sense of what that intelligence flow and information actually looks like
5:39
because from everything that we've read and seen, it boils down to one conversation that wasn't minuted
5:48
and some inaccurate information about the football team in question. So can you put us right then
5:59
I mean, I'm giving you the opportunity to tell us what the information and intelligence was
6:04
Intelligence comes in a range of forms. people giving information and intelligence
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which is then assessed and sanitised and it's then looked to be triangulated
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and corroborated, it's given a handling code and then it's listed. I'm not asking about the
6:17
process, I don't want to know about the process I'm actually asking for specific
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bits of information and intelligence if you were saying to me that we are not
6:27
entitled to that or that it's private and confidential, please do say that
6:31
What I'm just trying to do is be cautious about how I speak because, so for example
6:35
Being very cautious Thank you. There is something around. So in policing you have informants, for example. In policing you have technical feed, you have a range of sources of information intelligence online, chatter from people, human intelligence sources
6:52
So you have a range of intelligence that comes together that is then overlaid with a range of professional judgment
6:59
Can I help you just a little bit with that? Because I think I sort of see where you're coming from
7:06
the types of intelligence obviously you get intelligence from the community from individuals
7:12
and that intelligence is fed into the system but it's made in the form
7:17
of intelligence reports and we received a number of those intelligence reports
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off different people which fed in to what Mike has just been
7:28
receiving so in terms of like what are they you know I think that's
7:32
what we're getting at I'll tell you what I'm struggling with. The main source of intelligence is from a private conversation
7:41
with the Dutch police, which they are denying the contents of, which they have publicly doubled down on since this news was published
7:56
That's your main source of intelligence, and that you're willing to share publicly
8:03
that the Dutch police have effectively lied to their public and their press
8:08
but you not willing to tell us the other sources of information So it appears that that is really the only intelligence and information that you received And that the decision was based solely
8:22
on that and that we can't corroborate because the Dutch police have said that it's
8:29
categorically not true. So I'm trying to get a sense of what this decision was based on
8:36
Can I just offer a view as kind of relatively objective as far as it can be given
8:42
on this side of the table. But I made the reference point to
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the tipping point in the review. Because up until the intelligence from the Dutch police and briefing
8:54
that we've discussed, it was fairly clear to me that West Midlands police
8:58
were fully working on the basis that they were going to host the
9:02
Israeli fans, the Maccabi fans. There were contingencies in place and they were
9:06
exploring them. And it had some similarities to operations I've looked at in the past where there was considered high risk. I've got
9:13
to say I've been National League for 11 years and before that five years in GMP handling most of the
9:19
big events there and this is a unique situation. How many times have away fans been denied access to
9:27
Rare occasions. I think we came close to a decision around Ajax fans ironically a number of years ago
9:35
as a result of their behaviour. Personally, my closest experience was the first time Glasgow Rangers played in Manchester
9:44
after the European League final, where there was a riot in Manchester
9:49
I remember it well. The next time Glasgow Rangers got drawn to play in Manchester was against Manchester United
9:56
and there were real concerns there. One of the options we considered was banning Glasgow Rangers fans
10:01
the accommodation we reached there was that they all went to Wigan
10:06
in effect had a fan zone at Wigan and were only given their tickets once they got on the coaches to Manchester
10:11
I think there was a proposal here to have a fan zone in Walsall Absolutely, so that's the parallel C
10:16
where we had all the Glasgow Rangers fans go it was by consent, we don't really have a power to do it by coercion
10:23
Glasgow Rangers worked with the authorities and in effect they all met, they were fans groups
10:30
We roughly knew who they were. They got the ticket on the way to Old Trafford and they were escorted straight to the ground and straight out
10:37
That's the closest parallel I can think to this. And in the preparations for this event, West Midlands Police looked at an option to use a local football ground to try and do something
10:48
So I think it was clear that from the initial point up until the point of the Dutch intelligence, the plan was to host the fans
10:57
I think the tipping point is referred to there it's the Dutch intelligence
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