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My CCR Died at 240ft – How I Survived the Dive
Aug 31, 2025
This video details how my CCR died at 240 ft (70 metres) and how I survived the dive. It covers the two underwater failures of my Closed Circuit Rebreather (CCR) diving electronics; one at 50 metres (164 feet) and the other at 74 metres (240 feet)! I explain how I managed these emergency situations to safely return to surface including the use of the Head Up Display and a full CCR bailout with multi stage gas switching. Eagle eyed observers may notice that I suddenly grow a beard during the recording of this video!! *Highlights* 00:00 Introduction 00:50 Handset Failure Number 1 07:08 Handset Failure Number 2 11:14 My reflections *Support what I Do* Thanks for watching my video and if you'd like to support what I do then please consider joining my channel - http://bit.ly/4kMVqCB You may also wish to buy me a coffee - https://buymeacoffee.com/d33puk *Kit I Use* Note, some of these are affiliate links so help support making my videos: 👉 Gloves are Ansell Alphatec 87-063 - https://amzn.to/4jDHhX4 👉 Main torch is an Orcatorch D630 - https://amzn.to/4jlT4tA 👉 Backup torch is an Orcatorch D710 - https://amzn.to/4jhddRk 👉 Drysuit is an O-Three Ri2-100 - https://www.othree.co.uk/drysuit-range/ri-2-100-drysuit/
View Video Transcript
0:00
It's not supposed to be possible to get
0:02
a total electronics failure on a modern
0:04
rebreather, but that's exactly what
0:06
happened to me. I was 74 m down or 240
0:10
ft in old money if you prefer. In this
0:13
video, I'm going to explain exactly what
0:14
happened and how I survived to dive
0:17
another day. I'm also going to tell you
0:19
about a very similar experience that I'd
0:21
had just weeks before. Unfortunately, I
0:23
don't have any dive video, but what I do
0:25
have is lots of stills and images, and
0:27
I've also got the dive logs that I'm
0:29
going to use extensively to explain what
0:31
happened. I hope that's useful to you.
0:34
If it is, please leave us a like or drop
0:36
us a comment. But what I'd like to do
0:38
now is give you a bit of context first
0:40
of all. So, these incidents took place
0:41
in 2020. It was just after we'd come out
0:44
of the uh the first COVID lockdown, and
0:47
we were all really excited to be uh to
0:49
be getting back to diving. We decided
0:51
that what we were going to do was a
0:53
wreck called the Ambassador. Uh it's an
0:56
old 19th century steam ship sunk in a
0:58
collision. Sits in about 50 m of water.
1:01
And on its day, and this was absolutely
1:04
its day, it's a lovely dive. There's a
1:06
steering quadrant. There's the rudder.
1:08
You can see the prop is is gorgeous.
1:11
There's a lovely drive shaft there. And
1:14
uh here's some bits of engine. And
1:16
there's some boilers. So, you can see
1:18
it's a great dive. And I was having uh I
1:20
was having a lovely time. You see the
1:22
depth there, sort of 48 49 m. It's a bit
1:26
of a lump there. But then round about
1:28
here, that's when I had my issue. And
1:32
the issue that I had is this. I look
1:34
down and see the handset is full of
1:36
water. And that's one of those real kind
1:39
of heart in the mouth moments. You you
1:41
you talk about it, you train for it. Uh
1:43
but then when you actually see that it's
1:45
a real um you know a real moment frankly
1:49
and and and particularly as I was you
1:51
know at this point in the dive here. So
1:53
I've got 40 odd minutes of decompression
1:55
to do and I need to figure out how I'm
1:58
going to get to the surface. Now I've
2:00
got plenty of bailout gas. So I could
2:02
have bailed out. That wouldn't have been
2:03
a problem at all. But um most modern
2:07
rebreathers and the AP is no different
2:10
have redundancy for exactly this kind of
2:12
situation. So, so what you're seeing
2:14
here is a a bit of the rebreather. It's
2:17
it's the same bit just looked at two
2:18
different angles. It's the kind of head
2:20
with the electronics and other bits and
2:21
pieces in it. So, on the left hand side
2:23
here, you can see there's the uh display
2:25
unit which obviously would normally give
2:27
you P2, your depth, your decompression
2:29
information. It's also got the buttons
2:31
on it for controlling the rebreather.
2:34
That's all there. This thing here is the
2:36
head-up display, and we're going to come
2:37
back to that in a minute. And then over
2:39
here is the uh the beeper, the much
2:41
dreaded AP beeper, which anybody who's
2:43
dived with an Inspo diver will will know
2:46
all about that. So underneath the lid,
2:48
this is what it looks like. You can see
2:50
you've got three O2 sensors. There's a
2:52
battery, there's a solenoid, and various
2:55
other bits and pieces. But the things I
2:57
would like you to focus on are these uh
3:00
it sort of surrounded by the three by
3:02
the by the green dotted lines rather.
3:05
And inside there are the two
3:06
controllers. uh one um and the LEDs and
3:12
there's two lights associated with each
3:14
controller. So so you got that that
3:16
duplication there and what the
3:18
controllers do is they maintain the P2.
3:20
So they use the information from the
3:22
sensors and to control the solenoid to
3:25
maintain the P2 at whatever level is
3:28
set. Now, when the handset failed,
3:32
flooded, I lost the ability to change
3:34
that set point, but the controllers were
3:37
going to maintain it at whatever um I it
3:41
was at the time. So, in my case, it was
3:42
1.3 bar cuz that's what I'd had on the
3:45
bottom. Now, the handset also provides
3:49
pressure information, i.e. depth
3:51
information. So, that the head loses
3:53
that, the controllers lose that. So all
3:56
they're going to do is just maintain the
3:58
uh P2 at whatever the uh the last um you
4:04
know direction they were given. So that
4:08
is uh the um that that's what's going to
4:11
happen. That's what's going to and this
4:14
is how it's going to be shown to you.
4:15
It's going to be through the uh the the
4:17
HUD. And normally during a dive you'd
4:19
expect green uh two green lights. So one
4:22
on the left for the controller one and
4:23
one on the right for controller two.
4:25
That means it's safe to dive. But one of
4:28
the things AP are really keen to point
4:29
out is that the HUD also provides
4:32
sufficient information for a manual
4:33
ascent. So it will warn you if you get
4:36
dangerous P2. So that's too low. Um slow
4:40
flashing, fast flashing is uh too high.
4:43
But kind of critically for um this dive
4:47
is the fact that if you deviate from the
4:49
set point by more than 0.2 bar, you are
4:52
going to get this slow flashing light.
4:54
So, I was paying particular attention
4:56
for that and I didn't get it on the
4:58
ascent. So, I knew that the unit was
5:00
maintaining the P2 at the level that it
5:03
had been set. And what that meant is
5:06
that I could use my offboard sheer
5:08
water, i.e. the one that's not connected
5:10
to the rebreather, completely
5:11
independent. Um, but it knows the set
5:14
point that I'm diving. Obviously, it has
5:15
pressure information because it's got a
5:17
depth sensor. So, therefore, it can
5:19
calculate my decompression. And that's
5:21
exactly what happened. So, I used the
5:24
decompression information on the sheer
5:26
water and you can see there I cleared
5:28
all my deco stops and I then did a bit
5:30
longer because, you know, why wouldn't
5:32
you? Obviously, I've got plenty of gas
5:33
on the rebreather and it just, you know,
5:36
means that if the P2 hasn't been bang on
5:39
the money, it's uh it's clearly building
5:41
me a bit of credit in the bank. But
5:44
right at the end of the dive, I knew
5:46
that the unit wasn't going to be able to
5:47
maintain uh or was going to try to
5:50
maintain 1.3 bar once we came up to the
5:52
surface. Clearly, it couldn't do that
5:55
when the ambient pressure is one bar.
5:57
So, right at the end of the dive, I
5:59
bailed out onto my 50% that I was
6:01
carrying, and I did the the ascent from
6:03
6 m to the surface. um having bailed
6:07
out. I'd also closed my O2 cylinder at
6:09
that point so it didn't just carry on
6:11
throwing um oxygen out and that all
6:15
worked very well. I got up to the
6:17
surface there. I am all happy. I've
6:19
survived. I've done all my deco. I've
6:21
done the vast majority of it on the
6:22
rebreather and I'm going to get on the
6:24
boat and all will be well. So this is um
6:28
this worked this worked really well and
6:31
I guess is the kind of um failure that
6:34
you would expect um in this
6:37
circumstance. But what happens on the
6:40
next dive is is a very very different
6:42
failure. Before I talk about it though,
6:45
I I know people always like to know
6:46
where things are. So, uh, this is, uh,
6:49
the United Kingdom, and you can see here
6:51
down the very southwest, this is
6:53
Plymouth up here where where I live. And
6:57
out to sea, we've got the Edison
6:58
Lighthouse, which is a kind of
6:59
well-known local landmark or or possibly
7:02
Seaark. And the Ambassador, which is the
7:05
first uh, handset failure, is over here
7:07
off to the east. And the wreck that
7:10
we're diving on, the second failure is
7:11
the uh is out here uh known uh not
7:15
particularly imaginatively as the coal
7:16
block wreck. And the reason it's known
7:18
as a cobb block wreck is cuz obviously
7:20
it's full of patent fuel coal blocks.
7:23
Those things have got BZB on them. Um
7:26
which we think indicates that it's uh
7:29
some sort of origin in the continent
7:30
perhaps, you know, Belgium or Holland or
7:32
Germany or or somewhere like that, but
7:34
we we don't really know.
7:37
Um there's all sorts of interesting bits
7:39
and pieces on it like that. Uh there's
7:41
the engine. We've tried to identify it
7:43
um by measuring the the cylinders and
7:45
and not really got anywhere with that.
7:47
There's also various other bits of
7:49
engine machinery and stuff around in it.
7:52
And uh there you go. Uh lovely boiler.
7:54
So it's it's a nice wreck. Nice dive.
7:57
Fran and myself got in. I think we're
7:58
the first pair down. the shot wasn't
8:01
quite on the wreck. So, we had to uh use
8:04
distance line to kind of reel off and
8:06
eventually we came on the wreck and and
8:07
kind of shortly after I got on the
8:09
wreck, I looked down and I had a very
8:12
very similar handset failure to the to
8:14
the well identical handset failure to
8:15
the one that I'd I'd had before. Only
8:18
this one's at 74 m. Luckily, not quite
8:21
as long into the dive as uh as the first
8:23
one, but I was really really frustrated.
8:26
Loads of reasons for that. I mean, the
8:28
first thing is that um I'd only just
8:30
started the dive, so I was going to be
8:32
missing the rest of the dive. I knew
8:33
that. Uh second thing is, you know, I'd
8:36
had one of these merely a month before,
8:38
so that was really, really irritating.
8:40
And the third thing is it wasn't my
8:43
handset, it was somebody else's. So, my
8:45
recollection at the time is is I um
8:47
looked down at the handset, saw it was
8:49
completely flooded with water, and I
8:51
just pressed a whole load of buttons in
8:53
all sorts of different sequences. And
8:56
when I came to look at the HUD, the HUD
8:58
was uh was dead. There was no lights in
9:01
that. So, so there's a different
9:02
scenario. I no longer have the HUD. I no
9:05
longer have the handset. So, there is
9:07
only one option there, which is to uh to
9:09
bail out. So, I bailed out onto uh my
9:12
1464 bottom mix, carrying on on the left
9:15
hand side, and then I I swam back to the
9:18
lazy shot uh as you can see there. So,
9:22
um you question why why I did that?
9:24
Well, the reason is because I knew that
9:26
there was an 80% up on the up on the
9:28
line. I had felt I had quite a lot of
9:32
gas. I had a buddy with me who had quite
9:33
a lot of gas. So, um I felt that was
9:36
there was no issues with that. I then
9:38
came up, you know, relatively rapidly up
9:40
the up the shot line onto the lazy shot.
9:44
And then when I got to about 20 m, I
9:46
changed onto my 50%.
9:49
stayed on my 50% until I got up to um 80
9:53
sorry got up to 6 mters where the 80%
9:55
was and as you can see there spent the
9:57
rest of the time on the 80% uh cleared
10:00
my deco and then I actually switched
10:02
back to the 50% I left so left the 80%
10:06
in the water where it was as part of the
10:07
lazy shot system and then came up uh the
10:10
rest of the time on my 50% and um you
10:14
know got to surface without any problems
10:15
at all. So, in fact, I I was so
10:18
comfortable on the deco stops that I
10:20
actually was able to take some pictures.
10:22
So, there's Fran, who was with me as my
10:24
buddy. She was she was brilliant. Uh
10:27
there is a photo of the two of us. You
10:29
can see um the the sort of clip system
10:33
on uh my right is is the one that's
10:36
suspending the um the 80%. And as I say,
10:39
that was part of the the lazy shot
10:41
system. And you can see I'm I'm
10:43
breathing on it there. So, I'm on open
10:44
circuit. And uh a Fran, my buddy, is up
10:46
there behind me keeping a uh keeping a
10:49
good eye on me. And I think there you
10:51
go. One more. Another another selfie of
10:53
myself on the uh on the on the 80%. So
10:57
actually uh fairly chilled, fairly
11:00
relaxed, worked really well, and um end
11:03
result got to surface without any
11:05
problems at all. I know it's the same
11:06
photo. I only have one surfacing photo.
11:09
So uh so so there it is. So, uh, a few
11:12
interesting things to pick up there. So,
11:15
I'm going to start with the, uh, which
11:17
is the obvious one, which is I can
11:18
already hear people out there going, uh,
11:20
AP, you shouldn't dive in AP, you should
11:22
dive this unit, or you should dive that
11:24
unit, or these are better, or this never
11:27
happens to whatever, uh, you know, your
11:30
particular personal favorite unit is.
11:32
Um, now there's no doubt at all that AP
11:35
went through a bad, uh, sequence at this
11:38
time. You know, I know a few other
11:39
people who have had handset problems
11:40
with the cables and those kind of
11:42
things. What I would say is that all
11:45
units, all dive computers, all
11:47
underwater electronics, you know, can
11:50
and do go wrong. So, I know people with
11:52
lots of other models of um Rebreather,
11:55
lots of other models of computer that
11:57
have had similar issues to this. And I
11:59
did a Facebook post about this um you
12:03
know, about a week before I made this
12:04
video. And on there there's, you know,
12:06
different people who are flagging up
12:08
issues they've had with with different
12:09
units. So, let's leave the unit bashing.
12:12
It's all good fun. We all enjoy it. It's
12:14
all a good bit of bit of banter. But the
12:17
fundamental thing is these are all
12:18
complex things. They all have the
12:20
potential to go wrong underwater. And
12:23
you know that that happens. So, what do
12:25
you need to be able to do in those
12:26
situations? Well, the the number one
12:28
thing for me is you need to have a
12:30
bailout plan that is going to work. And
12:32
as you can see on this dive, my bailout
12:35
plan worked worked, you know, really
12:37
well. So, uh, I went through those three
12:40
um, three transfers, you know, from my
12:43
bottom mix to my 50% and then onto the
12:46
80% that was on the line. And, you know,
12:49
that was that was that was great. In
12:51
terms of uh, other things that I think
12:53
worked really well, um, I'm going to
12:56
flag up my buddy Fran. She's appeared in
12:59
a few of my videos. She is a fantastic
13:01
person to dive with and clearly she uh
13:04
she didn't have an awful lot to do on
13:06
this, but she was there all the time.
13:08
She was checking that I'd made uh
13:10
switches. She was checking that my
13:11
handset correct or my computer settings
13:13
were correct and all those kind of
13:14
things. And just having somebody next to
13:16
you when when things aren't going going
13:18
so well is is really really nice. So
13:21
having a having a buddy is something I'm
13:22
a big fan of. Uh something that I I
13:26
guess I uh you know maybe not so so
13:29
pleased with myself for you know the uh
13:32
the suggestion is uh from AP is that
13:36
when my handset flooded all the buttons
13:39
that I pressed I managed to operate the
13:42
turn off sequence and I actually shut
13:44
the unit down. Now that is entirely
13:47
possible. Um, so, so even though the
13:50
screen was dead, the buttons were still
13:51
responsive and it was me
13:54
pressing buttons that managed to turn it
13:56
off. So, you know, that's that seems
13:58
reasonable. I can't come up with any
13:59
other explanation. So, I'm going to go
14:02
with the AP suggestion that I disabled
14:05
the HUD. It kind of doesn't matter in
14:07
the sense of I had to deal with it
14:09
underwater and had to to to sort it all
14:11
out. But for anybody in the future, if
14:14
you have an issue like this, I would say
14:16
um you know, don't don't randomly start
14:20
pressing buttons um because you may have
14:22
unintended consequences. I guess the
14:25
other thing that I need to mention, of
14:26
course, is that you aren't supposed to
14:28
be able to turn a rebreather off
14:30
underwater. So, how on earth did I
14:33
manage to do that? Once again, this came
14:35
up in the discussion that I had with AP.
14:38
And if you think about it, the thing
14:39
that prevents a rebreather from being
14:42
turned off underwater is when it senses
14:45
ambient pressure, you know, greater than
14:47
normal. So on the uh inspiration, that
14:51
information comes from the pressure
14:52
sensor. Pressure sensor is on the
14:54
handset. When the handset floods, uh
14:57
clearly the pressure sensor uh dies as
14:59
well. So what must have happened is a
15:02
particularly I had a particularly small
15:04
window of opportunity where the uh the
15:08
screen on the handset had gone. The
15:10
pressure sensor on the handset had gone
15:12
but the buttons were still functional
15:14
and somehow during that that brief
15:16
window was when I managed to turn the uh
15:19
to turn the handset off. That's the the
15:22
only explanation any of us can come up
15:24
with. I mean if you've got a better one
15:26
then um obviously I would love to hear
15:28
it. It would be really interesting. But
15:30
as as far as you know, I'm concerned, I
15:32
just had a particularly well, I
15:34
obviously had a a particularly
15:36
misfortunate set of circumstances. Full
15:38
stop. But then that was compounded by
15:40
this um me being able to turn it off
15:43
during this brief window when the sensor
15:45
was dead. The handset screen was dead,
15:47
but the buttons were still functioning
15:48
and still communicating with the uh with
15:51
the controller in the head. So um there
15:54
you go. It was my unlucky day. So that's
15:59
I guess um me critiquing myself in terms
16:03
of anything that we do differently now.
16:05
I guess uh one of the things that we do
16:07
differently is we no longer put the 80%
16:09
as part of the lazy shot system. We now
16:12
have the 80% on the boat uh along in
16:15
fact we have a much more comprehensive
16:16
drop system cylinder system now and that
16:19
is available. So if you do need to come
16:21
up directly from the wreck, you can call
16:23
for it and it can be brought over to you
16:26
rather than you having to get back to
16:27
the lazy shot system to to to get that
16:30
um rich deco mix. So that's probably the
16:32
big change that we've uh we've we've
16:35
made as a result of this. Um
16:38
so yeah, well I hope you've enjoyed uh
16:42
hearing about my uh double handset
16:45
failure, including the that really rare
16:47
one, the the total electronics failure.
16:50
And if you've enjoyed it and you found
16:52
it useful, it would be really good if
16:54
you give us a like. If you have
16:56
something to say, leave us a comment.
16:58
That's always really appreciated. And
17:00
other than that, I will look forward to
17:02
seeing you uh on the next one of my
17:04
videos.