Webcast - Building the All-Domain Force
Sep 26, 2025
Defense News examined the challenges of an all-domain defense strategy
View Video Transcript
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Hello, everyone, and welcome to today's Defense News webcast
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I'm J.D. Durkin, a contributor here at Defense News. Today, we're all taking a closer look at one of the most pressing challenges facing U.S
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as well as allied forces. And that is, of course, building a truly integrated all-domain force, one across land, air, sea space, and of course, the cyber realms as well
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We'll be exploring what is needed to achieve real-time data sharing, trustworthy information, and speed of action in heavily contested environments
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Before we dive in, of course, I would like to thank Honeywell for sponsoring today's discussion
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And to kick things off, I am joined by Tom Kinnicki. He is the Director of Business Development at Honeywell Aerospace
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Tom, good morning. Welcome. Thanks a lot for taking the time. It's great to have you
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Good morning. Nice to be here. Thank you for having me. Tom, let's kick things off by taking a closer look at the state of all domain integration today and really the theme being interoperability
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That's a word. I know you know it. It's often described as the kind of foundation of an all domain strategy
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Tom, where do you most think progress has been made and where do you think the gaps are that still need to be closed
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Yeah, it's a great question. You know, from my perspective, you know, 23 years in the military
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I've been with Honeywell for eight years now, and I've seen it, you know, throughout both sides of it, both from an industry perspective and from the Air Force perspective
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You know, there has been progress, but there is certainly more work to be done
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You know, Joint Warfighter Concept 3.0, that's the joint force, that's the guiding document for joint capability requirements in the U.S. military
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And we all know interoperability is a buzzword, but, you know, many joint requirements require both interdependency and interoperability
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You know, very few domains today are still service specific outside of maybe the undersea domain
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For example, most of us know that when the fifth generation aircraft first came online, they were unable to pass targeting data to one another
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The Air Force has done a great job since then to solve this issue. But this type of challenge remains at a joint force level within the United States, as well as with our international partners
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So you need an architecture, an architecture that can enable any sensor to cue, an architecture that can support any shooter
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You know, that is really what's required to realize a true all-domain force
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To further elaborate on that, from my perspective, there's still gaps in data standards and the architecture
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So, again, we've made some progress, but it's still hindered by inconsistent data formats
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There's still a lot of legacy systems out there, many siloed architectures
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You know, closing these gaps, this requires a unified digital backbone, and there has to be common standards across the services and among the partner nations
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You know, the need for partner nation and industry synchronization is also key as well
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You know, true all-domain interoperability, you know, must extend beyond U.S. forces to include coalition partners, industry
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You know, we need to accelerate the efforts to align the technologies and the protocols and the operational frameworks to ensure seamless collaboration in contested environments
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And I don't want to minimize the level of effort to accomplish everything that I'm just talking about across industry and across nations
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It is a monumental task, and it is going to take immense effort on everyone's part to do so
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Tom, from your vantage point, where do you see as being some of the biggest challenges that the U.S. as well as the allies, its allies face in building that all domain force? What are those headwinds
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Yeah, you know, from again, my perspective, I think policy challenges, you know, based on the various national interests that are out there. You know, for example, AI, you know, the implementation, the policy behind that, trying to pace that with a threat, that's going to present a challenge and continues to present a challenge for us
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You know, where does that play? And there's certainly investments that will be required. Maybe one of the larger ones beyond that is the sharing of classified information
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You know, enabling coalitions, all domain forces, you know, this requires policy and architecture that permits critical sharing of, for instance, ISR
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intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, as well as targeting and threat information. You know, the technology ecosystem remains fragmented
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You know, it's one of the biggest challenges in integrating a diverse platform, sensors, and systems across services and the partner nations
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You know, many were developed independently, creating interoperability and data sharing hurdles that, as of now, seem to slow down the joint operations
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Partner nations also operate under different rules of engagement, different acquisition timelines, different cybersecurity standards
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You know, harmonizing these frameworks is essential to establish and enable seamless collaboration for rapid decision making
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And then, of course, building an all domain force requires a workforce that's fluent in digital operations
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You know, they need to be fluent in AI, cyber warfare. So you've got to recruit, train and retain the talent across the military and the civilian sectors and then foster the culture of jointness within those groups
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So those remain persistent challenges to us. Yeah, you mentioned the importance and underscored the importance there of rapid decision making
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I think, Tom, that speed of decision making, it is critical, specifically in contested environments
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I'm sure you'd agree. How well positioned do you think are allied forces today in order to achieve the kind of real-time data sharing that's actually required
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Yeah, you know, this has been a focus area for the U.S. government and for industry and for international partners for a very long time
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My last job in the Air Force, I worked in what was called SAFIA, the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs
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So we were helping our foreign partners procure U.S. systems primarily, whether it's F-16s, F-15s, weapons, you name it
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And a main focus of our area has always been and remains to this day, the ability to achieve real-time data sharing
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So it's not just SAFIA, it's their sister implementing agencies like the Navy International Program Office
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DASADEC from the Army, DSCA, and Industry Partners. You know, they continue to focus on this real-time data sharing of the issues today
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I would say in an unclassified environment, we're actually doing pretty well
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in our ability to achieve real-time data sharing. The problem comes when you start getting into the classified realm
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when you get secret, top secret, special access, and so on. That's really where we continue to struggle
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An example I'll give you, and I won't name the country, but I worked when I was back in Safiyeh
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There was a country that was buying F-16s from the U.S. government
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But they had previously purchased some Gripen fighters from the country of Sweden And as part of that deal with Sweden Sweden had given what they called their indigenous data link
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And then here I roll in a couple of years later selling F-16s
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And I say, well, the NATO standard for data link and for us all to be on the same network is called link 16
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And this country was hellbent on saying, no, I want to use my indigenous data link
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I said, well, there's two problems with that. Problem one is Sweden, who sold that to you, doesn't even use that anymore
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They've gone to link 16 as the new standard. And the second problem is that when the joint task force, usually US-led, when that happens
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and when that occurs, if you're on a different network, you're not going to be part of
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of the team, if you will. You're going to be on a different network. We're not going to see you
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you're not going to see us. So you're not going to be involved in the operations as they're unfolding
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at least not with the rest of the coalition group. So you're going to be on the outside looking in
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You know, and I chalk that up to a few things. You know, part of it might be national pride from
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the country. Maybe they just want to have something on their own. In some cases, maybe they don't want
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to rely on the US to obtain some of these, the crypto keys, for example, to give them access to
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a link 16. And I get that, right? You know, maybe there's a fear the US, maybe the State Department
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may roll in and say, you know what, I'm going to sanction your country for this reason, this reason
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this reason. Maybe we don't like your stance on human rights. Maybe we didn't appreciate
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how you transitioned from your last administration to this current administration. So maybe there's a fear that they're going to have these systems and access to these systems cut off. And again, I get that, and that's fair
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There also may be a fear on the other end of it, maybe from the US, maybe because we had talked about this, is it okay for us to ingest some of the data coming from that country system into our system
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But there's always a fear that that maybe even might corrupt some of our data
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So, you know, at the end of the day, we know what the concepts are. We know what needs to happen
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You know, releasability, exportability, those things cannot be ignored. But the capabilities and products to influence and affect interoperability, you know, that still needs to be the focus
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And the combined JADC2 that you've heard of for the coalition and senior leader decision making, you know, that's paramount
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Yeah, Tom, there's no doubt. It's certainly very much a tough balance between protecting data on the one hand while ensuring accessibility on the other. Talk to me about some of the ways that you most see that. What are the pressing concerns when it comes most to securing and trusting information in this all domain encompassing fight we've been chatting about
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You bet. There's several areas we need to consider in the evolving threat landscape, certainly to give ourselves the highest chance of success
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One of the most pressing concerns, again, in my opinion, is securing the sensitive data against these evolving threats
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As technology advances, so do the tactics used by our adversaries. In an all domain environment where land, sea, air, and cyber, where all those domains intersect, we must be vigilant about who has access to what information
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Ensuring that not only authorized personnel can access critical data, that's vital, but we need robust encryption methods to protect the data, whether it's in transit or at rest
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Trusting the information that we receive and sharing is a huge concern
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In this day and age where misinformation can spread rapidly, especially through the digital channels, we need to ensure the data integrity
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And this is actually where one of the emerging technologies that Honeywell is creating, our quantum key distribution of QKD, we call it
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That's where this comes into play. You know, our QKD allows us to secure communication channels against interception, making sure the information shared is not only private, but also verifiably trustworthy
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And finally, we need to consider the accessibility of this information. In high-stakes situations, people on the ground, they need immediate access to real-time data to make these informed decisions
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This means that they have to develop systems that are secure, but user-friendly
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Striking that balance is essential. Our teams must be able to rely on information without cumbersome barriers, but it also must be protected against unauthorized access
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Tom, I know it can be very difficult to give projections for the landscape of ever-evolving technology, but if you had to take a look at the next five to ten years even, what types of technologies, key innovations do you think may end up making the biggest difference in enabling truly integrated all-domain operations
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Great question. I would say my top response here is communication technology
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If you can't communicate, you're done. If you lose communications, I suppose the military operator can proceed using commander's intent
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But the precise coordination required of future conflicts with coalition partners makes constant and secure communication paramount
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For the online-of-sight communications, the U.S. and partner nations continue to espouse their desire to have multiband, multinetwork, multiorbit
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They want to have all of those approaches rolled up into a single terminal to communicate, which I think they should be able to achieve in the next five years
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But if you look at the next big mover, I would say 10 years down the road or about that, I think you'll see a migration to the 5G non-terrestrial networks, which offer more open protocols for satellite communications
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And I think that is going to be a big game changer for all domain operations
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Those non-terrestrial networks, they integrate satellite-based communications with the standard 5G networks to provide pervasive global connectivity for areas beyond the reach of traditional cell phone towers
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If you look at using low-Earth orbit technologies and satellite networks like Starlink, Starshield, OneWeb, Amazon's Kuiper, Telesat's Lightspeed, Spin Launch's Meridian, you use those along with other airborne platforms
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The 5G non-terrestrial network, those will enhance, it will offer enhanced coverage for remote regions supporting emergency services
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It's going to enable new Internet of Things applications and direct-to-device satellite connectivity that we just haven't seen
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So I think that's going to happen in the next 10 years. That's my prediction
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Kenicki is the Director of Business Development at Honeywell Aerospace. Tom, thank you for your context, the much needed perspective and helping us set the stage for our conversation today
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Tom, thank you. Thank you again for having me. Folks, don't go anywhere
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We will be taking a very short break. And when we return, I will be joined by James Lewis from CSIS to take a closer look into the strategic and policy dimensions of building the all domain force
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Stay with us. We see you next time Welcome back everyone I am now joined by James Lewis Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic
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and International Studies. Jim, thanks a lot for taking the time to be here. It is great to have
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you join us today. Thank you for having me on the show. So let's start with a look at a bit of the
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broader the bigger picture on the conversation when we talk about building an all-domain force
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Jim, what is the scope of that challenge today from where you're situated
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You know, a good way to think about this in very broad terms is we are in what some people call
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a fourth industrial revolution. And it's driven by AI, by semiconductors, by software, and it will
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change warfare. That's what we all know. So what I'm looking at, it will be continuous change
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That's one of the challenges. So we have to look at a battlefield that'll be populated or driven by electronic warfare, by drones, by robots and automation, by space
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So what I see is a very different field emerging and a field where the U.S. has some advantages for a change
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So that's a big plus. Jim, how do you actually define the challenge of building an all-domain force? And talk to me a bit about why integration across land, across air, sea, space, and cyber are also difficult
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You know, integration goes back at least to World War II when people started to say
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you had an army and a navy then, that was it, and they couldn't work with each other
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And if you think about Goldwater-Nichols, if you think about all the efforts to get
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integrated combatant capabilities, integrated forces, we don't want a purple force. So one of the challenges is the services have unique cultures, and there's benefits to those
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cultures. Another issue is the technology. A lot of it comes from the commercial sector
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It's built on different standards. It's built not to military specifications. And they have trouble
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integrating this stuff in the commercial world. So I don't know why we should be any different
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Finally, if you want to complicate the mix even more, throw in allies. Allies are at varying
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levels from very low to okay, varying levels of technological sophistication. NATO has been doing
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some work on standards. We've done a little work with the Japanese, but it's just, you've inherited
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this very complicated situation where new technologies are reshaping how people fight wars
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and the side that can figure it out, I do think we have an advantage, but the side that can figure
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out how to integrate will do better. Jim, what would you say are some of the largest technical
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the bureaucratic, the cultural barriers to achieving actual interoperability across both U.S. and the allied forces you were just referencing there a moment ago
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You know, the bureaucratic challenge is for me the biggest challenge, and that challenge would be the acquisition rules
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The acquisition rules in the U.S., as they're written now, are an obstacle to progress
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It's not the intent. It's well-meaning. But I'd say if we can't figure out how to streamline and accelerate the acquisitions process, that's a serious disadvantage for the US
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I was laughing at a piece I saw. It might have been in defense news about how after five years, a prototype satellite would finally enter testing
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It's like, five years? Are you kidding me? They don't have five years in Ukraine. So I think that's the biggest one
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The cultures are very different, too. And so if you've worked with foreign militaries, Europe essentially disarmed about 35 years ago
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They figured, hey, we're going to cash in the peace dividend. And they've got a long way to go
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When you look at their sensor capabilities, when you look at their space capabilities, when you look at their EW capabilities
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So the varying degrees of sophistication in the allies combined with the problems we have with our acquisition system make integration a hard one
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Data, without a doubt, Jim, you know better than most is at the heart of this strategy
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What are some of the infrastructure needs to ensure that information can actually flow effectively and seamlessly across different domains
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And I would say that people are thinking about that. the U.S. has probably made more progress than any other country. I don't always say that, so this is
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a red-letter day for me. You know, one thing we haven't used yet is the word cloud, right? And
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cloud is crucial to this because all these, think of this environment populated by all sorts of
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devices, all of which are generating information, all of which are coming in to overwhelm the people
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at the other end. And that means you need to have secure cloud communication. Cyber security is
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important. It means you need to think about the AI tools that will manage this data flow. And AI
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you know, whenever you say AI, people immediately flash to the Terminator. This isn't the Terminator
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This is how do I aggregate thousands of data streams from different devices in a way that
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gives me advantage on the battlefield. Jim, how do you go about measuring or weighing, I should say
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the benefits of those tools, those Terminator-type AI tools that people may think of them as
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and general machine learning capabilities against the risks that that very same technology may
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inherently introduce? Well, so I was at a big IT conference in China, and my Chinese
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sponsors had me meet with one of their CAO of a Chinese AI company. And so we were talking
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I was interviewing him kind of like this. And I said, well, tell me what you think about risk
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What's the risk from AI? And he said something that has stuck with me, even though it's been
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years. He said, let's not talk about risk. Let's talk about opportunity. So there's always going to
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be risk in new weapons and new ways of fighting. And the question is, how do you manage that risk
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in ways that don't cancel the benefits you get. And that's more what I'm worried about
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is that if you worry too much about risk, you could lose some of the opportunities
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And this is, as you know very well, this is an iterative process
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We're gonna build something, it's gonna be okay, but it'll need to change, evolve, fix
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And I think if we can stay on top of that iterative process
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with the idea in mind that we take advantage of the new technology and use it to build integration across combat capabilities, we'll
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do better than our opponents. Jim, I wonder, are there popular misconceptions as it pertains to those very capabilities
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Do you see things be frequently misinterpreted? And if so, what are those popular misconceptions about general either interoperability or military
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readiness from where you're seated? Well, we won't make fun of Terminator movies
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I love them, by the way. I think they're great, but that's one
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When you talk to a civilian population, a lot of them who aren't in the defense community
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a lot of them flash to killer robots. It like forget it I love robots Would you rather be shot at or have the robot shot at They cool Right But I think some of the misconceptions are this can happen naturally We can just layer it
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over the existing system and we will need to make changes. And particularly when you put it in an
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alliance context, the idea that there's this seamless interoperability now, we don't have that
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now we will have even less of it when we adopt a new technology. So the biggest misconception is
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I'd say the biggest misconception is this will be easy. I was thinking about that in preparation for
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this call. Where would you put the locus of change? And I decided that it was probably the E5
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pardon me, the 05, 06 level. It's the lieutenant colonels and the colonels are going to have to
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play with this stuff and figure out how to make it work together. And that might not be what we
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think. It might be a DARPA thing too. But the biggest problem is the assumption that interoperability
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is easy. There's just, you know, Clausewitz talked about the fog of war and the friction of warfare
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Friction applies to interoperability as well. So how do we overcome that
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Jim I wonder what keeps you up at night with regards to the conversation you and I are having
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oh nothing keeps me up at night well I had teenage kids and that kept me up at night
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this is this is nothing compared to teenagers going to the navy yard at two in the morning
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but you know what I worry about is uh the Chinese have some advantages right and the it's a
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dictatorship. So they can say Xi Jinping, who really cares about this stuff in a way that we
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don't always understand, he's sure that AI is going to be the wave of the future. He can say
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by the way, I want something new on my desk in two weeks. And if you don't get it, you're going
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to be harvesting turnips in Mongolia, if you're lucky. So the advantage that China has in being
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able to make decisions in being able to allocate funding. We made a mistake as a government. I was
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part of this in, say, 2000. We thought China was going to be our friend. The Chinese thought they
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were going to be our friends. And so we let them in. And now they have a very different model that
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changed about 10 years ago for them to be competitors and now opponents. So what keeps
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new upside is that maybe our system won't be as good as generating outcomes in the near term as
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the Chinese. And that's where we need to do some work. Acquisitions is part of that. But so is
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strategy and strategic culture. So if I worry about anything, it's it. You know, I'm usually
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what I came in at a generation right after when they had this slogan fight outnumbered and win
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which I always thought was really dumb, right? But now it's like we are in that situation again
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We are outnumbered. The Chinese are as good at generating technology. How do we deal with that
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You mentioned Ukraine and that kind of potential five-year window you were a bit skeptical of
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earlier in our conversation. And I wonder, as you watch the ongoing conflict in Ukraine
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Are there lessons on the ground, either from that conflict, maybe other recent conflicts as well, that you think, Jim, can best be applied to both the United States and its allies in terms of things like integrated warfare and data-driven decision-making that comes across in a very rapid and swift way
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You know, the Ukraine, unfortunately, has turned out to be the laboratory of warfare. And that's unfortunate because they're nice people, they deserve better. But they don't have an integration problem as much because they have a very small naval force. Their air force is relatively small
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What's come across in the Ukraine thing, and this always isn't obvious, and this is a problem with
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Europe, is the infrastructure behind it, the informational infrastructure behind it, the space assets, the intelligence assets, the EW assets, and pulling all those together into
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an effective force is a challenge for anyone. Ukraine has real pressure to perform, but Ukraine
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could not do what it was doing without that U.S. military information infrastructure behind it
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And we need to think, how do we build it out for what our purposes will be? What works in a ground
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war in Ukraine may not work in an air-sea battle around Taiwan. So that's the lesson for us is
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don't assume things are working. And I know the people in PACOM do not assume things are working
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right? They are making a hard effort. But the other thing that amazed me, I met with some
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Ukrainian drone companies about a month ago, the pace at which they generate new technology
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and the pace at which they generate new solutions, you know, for them, we were kidding about five
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years a little while ago. For them, five months would be way too long. So I do worry about that
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is that we're so used to being superior that somebody could easily sneak up on us
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And the Ukrainians don't have that problem. So those are the lessons for us
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Speed, agility, with the word you hear a lot, speed, agility, and integration
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How do you think, Jim, that the allied nations should best balance the need on the one hand
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for common standards with the realities of procurement systems and defense priorities
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What does that sort of intersection look like for you? It looks really grim
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And it's not helped by the fact that you now have some of the major countries in Europe, Germany, France, talking about building a defense structure that's free of the U.S. that will undercut integration
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You know, it might seem like a good idea politically, but at the end of the day, we're going to have to fight together
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You don't see that with the Japanese or the Koreans, that's a plus. So the main thing we need to think about is reinforcing the bureaucratic and political structures that drive towards integration
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NATO is the best example, and NATO is actually making some progress here
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But European culture, Europe is not defense-oriented. That's changing now as they look over their shoulders and see some guy named Vlad sneaking up on him
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But we have to work with countries that don't have as much money, that are way behind in the technology, and are a little bit suspicious of something anymore
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So it's the political and bureaucratic obstacles to integration. Once we get those out of the way, that'll be easy
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We can start moving to figure out a joint way to fight. And since you mentioned maybe pressure from Russia, in what ways have you watched the European allies either adjust their course or maybe have a shift in conversation the last few years that maybe underscores or puts an example on that shift of priority and focus in Europe
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Now, I was talking to someone in Brussels about this very subject, someone connected to the European Union
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And they said that three years ago, four years ago, national security was a bad word in Brussels
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You didn't want to talk about national security. They didn't want to hear about it
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If they talked about building European technology, defense didn't figure into it
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That's completely shifted in the last year. Europe now sees defense. They're more worried about it than we are, right
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Because they realize how weak they are. So I think the change in Europe, what we have to figure out is, are we going to be part of
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that change or are they going to go their own way? And right now, they're undecided
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They realize the benefits of working with the U.S., of relying on U.S. defense companies
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but they also fear the political consequences of being subservient. So we have a challenge here, but Europe's views on defense have changed
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You know, when you get people from Europe telling you, seriously, they're worried about Russian tanks rolling down the Shamsi
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they say, I'm not making that up. That's crazy. But they see they're much more intensely threatened by Russia than we are
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Maybe we should be. Commercial industry, as you know, it often moves faster in arenas, some of which you've mentioned, things like cloud, cyber, open systems
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What changes, Jim, I wonder? What do you think most needs to happen for defense to better leverage those distinct advantages that it already has
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You know, when you look at one experiment, I was in the room in 2015 when Ash Carter said he needed to reconnect Silicon Valley and the Pentagon
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And the start of that was something called the Defense Innovation Unit. Now many of the services have things like Softworks or AFWERX
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you've seen an effort on the part of DOD to generate new ways of doing business that more
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closely match what the commercial sector does, that more closely match the investment cycle
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DOD has amazing research capabilities and DOD knows what the military problems are. We don't
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have the connect, though, to civilian products, commercial products. That's changing for the
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better, but it's still a major. Some of it's acquisition rules. I'll keep coming back to that
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as an obstacle. Some of it's timing. I'll give you an example that's kind of funny in a sad way
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someone I know is the head of a little company that makes technology for space sensors and
32:33
military use. And he went to DOD and they told him, fill out these forms and come back in four
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months, right? By coincidence, and I assume it was SIGINT, by coincidence, a Chinese investor
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showed up, this was a couple of years ago, showed up and said, I can write you a check for $10
32:51
million right now. Now, this guy was a patriot. He was Chinese-American, which is interesting
33:00
because he said, no thanks. But we have to make people have the opportunity to move quickly
33:08
We don't match the commercial sector in speed, in flexibility. And that's our strength as a
33:15
country. We need to figure out how to bring more of that to DOD. You mentioned China. How does China's approach to integration compare with the US and its allies and the challenges the US faces
33:29
The Chinese continue to struggle with integration, and you can see it because they continue to reorganize. They haven't found a good fit yet. And they're thinking about how do I combine space, cyber with the traditional forms of military power
33:45
But they have problems. The first problem is inexperience. Like someone said to me, the Chinese are building all these new weapons
33:53
And it's like, yeah, but they haven't been tested in combat. China has never been in combat
33:58
The last war they were in was with Vietnam, and they lost that in about two weeks
34:03
So inexperience is a problem for China. If you don't know what the problems are, how do you design solutions for them
34:10
And one way, of course, is the Chinese closely track what the U.S. is doing
34:14
The second problem they have is corruption. When was the last time we had multiple generals fired for corruption
34:22
I can't even remember it. I can't even think of an example. So corruption is part of the Chinese system
34:29
And that means maybe they can't trust the stuff they're getting. So it's the lack of experience
34:35
Someone, a friend of mine at Georgetown, sent me a picture, posted a picture of the Chinese testing their carrier
34:43
carrier takeoff. And he noted that nothing else was on the deck. It's not like a U.S. carrier
34:50
where it's busy and everyone's moving around and they have colored T-shirts. The Chinese had to
34:55
clear the decks to test the singular. That's not how it works in warfare. So they do have this
35:01
advantage, though, of Xi Jinping does not have to worry about getting congressional approval
35:06
He doesn't have to worry about lawyers. He doesn't have to worry about saying
35:11
I have to balance the budget. He can just say, this is what we need to do
35:16
So on the one side, the advantage is being an autocrat. On the other side, corruption and inexperience
35:25
So on the whole, the Chinese are much better than we give them credit for usually
35:31
They really are a peer. And that's going to be a challenge for the U.S. if we don't pick up our pace
35:36
On the flip side of that ysis, Jim, I wonder what are the advantages the U.S. may have given how our system is, that we do have democratic elections as frequently as we do, that Congress, not the president, according to the Constitution, is responsible for waging and engaging in warfare, that our elected officials do have additional concerns, budgetary, fiscal policy, and others, that maybe on the surface may seem as a result
36:06
additional roadblocks that some of our adversaries don't have. But are there advantages
36:11
that that allows for the United States, I wonder? Yeah, I think we do have an advantage. And
36:17
it's maybe a little obscured right now. But if you talk to people in both House and Senate
36:24
they'll tell you, you know, what gets the attention are the big spats and the disputes
36:29
And there's some members who love going on social media and saying outrageous things. But
36:35
In general, they work together. They have a sense of what the common good is
36:40
I hope we can rebuild the old, remember, politics stops at the water's edge, and national security is a bipartisan thing
36:52
We kind of damage that by the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq
36:58
You can lose two wars and not expect there to be political turmoil But underneath that there still this consensus And so if we can figure out a way that is possible to hook the engine of American innovation to
37:14
defense needs, we'll pull ahead of China. And I think I'm kind of an optimistic. The real issue
37:20
the real question is when. And some people say China's going to invade Taiwan in 2027
37:25
And that'll depend on the signals we send them. But we managed to fall behind. We're behind. We're outgunned. We're outnumbered. They have better missiles. They have better drones. That's not a good thing. They have more ships
37:41
If they give us a couple years, we can catch up. That's what I worry about is that the advantages that the U.S. has, the innate advantages that the U.S. has will take some time to pull together, and hopefully we'll get that time
38:00
Jim, since we're mentioning policymakers here in the United States and in Washington, D.C., I wonder, are they prone to misconceptions
38:10
And if so, what are those biggest misconceptions that you see among our policymakers or even members of the public about an all-domain force and all-domain operations
38:21
You know, an all-domain, I think it's – you haven't seen a movie about an all-domain force
38:27
You may never see a movie about an all-domain force, in part because it's not as dramatic, right
38:34
It's not going to be Top Gun. But in some ways, that's what you have in front of you is the ability to conceptualize what all-domain warfare looks like
38:45
what pooling together an integrated force, an integrated ability to deliver effect will look like
38:51
And I think that one of the misconceptions is a concept, this is more true in the previous administration, that we're so far ahead of China, we don't have to worry about it
39:02
We're not ahead of China. They're a peer. Another misconception is that the progress we've made in building an integrated force is adequate for the new challenges that the new technologies will bring
39:17
And that's not true either. We have to go to a period of experimentation in organization and strategy and doctrine
39:25
And that's always tough. In the past, experimentation has been driven by the pressure of combat, right
39:33
When you're being shot at, suddenly a lot of the other obstacles fall away
39:39
We aren't there yet. Hopefully we won't get there, but we've got to figure out how do we pick up the pace to
39:44
improve integration. I would focus on the combatant commanders. At the end of the day, they're the guys. They already have to integrate. They've got naval, air, land, cyber components that they already have to integrate. So let's see what the combatant commanders would say for building a more effective integrated force
40:02
Jim, when you listen to lawmakers in Washington talk about China, it has become at times very much a badge of honor, I would argue, for a member of Congress, regardless of his or her political party, to be known as a hawk on China, to speak very tough with regards to the rhetoric on Beijing, and not to needlessly get into the politics of it
40:25
But I wonder, as you listen to proposed solutions and the rhetoric from our policymakers in Washington, do you feel as if the tone, the temperature with which our policymakers talk about Beijing is at least guided in the right direction and therefore what's left to debate are simply the nuances of the execution itself
40:46
Or do you feel as if maybe, you know, in the rush to do things like cable news interviews and social media clips, like you said earlier, that maybe even some of our most important voices on Capitol Hill may misconstrue some of the most important things to keep in mind
41:03
So for those of you who played on a sports team, criticizing the other team does not score points, right
41:11
And so what I worry about is we need to think about what is it that will put the U.S. ahead
41:16
You know, China bad. Got it. And I know they have to say that. And it's a lot of fun
41:21
But it doesn't actually address the integration problems, the innovation problems, the research
41:27
problems that we have as a country. We're doing OK. I think one benefit is we're on the defensive
41:34
And it's easier to be the defender, right? But we took our eye off the ball for many years
41:42
And the Chinese are now ahead of us. So I'd rather have people tell me, it's like, okay, visas
41:49
You want to charge for visas, HB2 or HB1 or whatever, H1B, I beg your pardon
41:57
Go ahead, charge. But where's the accompanying program to create the American tech force that we'll need, right
42:04
It's not there. We used to have it. We had it in the Eisenhower administration
42:09
We need to do that again. So TikTok is not that scary to me because if you're a Chinese spy, your primary target is not going to be a bunch of lip syncing teenagers
42:23
Maybe they have an influence campaign. Some people believe they do. Where's our counter to what the Chinese are doing
42:29
So what I worry about with this debate is it's easy to say China bad. It's easy to describe the problem
42:35
But I think we ought to pay a little more attention to what are the solutions
42:39
This administration, to its credit, and I don't usually give them credit, but to its credit, they figured out some of the problems
42:46
They figured out when you look at the efforts on acquisitions, when you look at the effort on integration of forces, they're doing okay
42:55
You know, not fast enough, but that's a different solution. That's a different way to look at it
43:03
Don't tell me China's a problem. Tell me how you're going to counter it
43:06
also i do say i'll just say this thing people say we have to beat china in the race what does that
43:12
mean does that mean we get we cross the finish line first where is the finish line so let's this
43:17
is a long-term conflict we need to think long-term and i don't hear enough of that you know if one
43:24
more person tells me we have to beat china in the ai race what does that even mean but if you see it
43:30
on the battlefield you know we're winning you mentioned there you mentioned a moment ago jim
43:36
The United States proverbially here taking its eye off the ball with regards to China
43:41
Could you help diagnose for me a little bit how and when that happened
43:45
Do you look back at relatively recent U.S. history? Not to ask you to assign blame to one administration or another, but at what point do you think did that calculus change where the U.S. is now went from looking over its shoulder to realizing should have maybe been paying a little bit closer attention over several key years
44:06
So the numbers fluctuate a little bit but we spent trillion in the war on terror trillion And if we devoted even a fraction of that to forced modernization to new technology
44:23
we would be much better off. So it was a strategic failure. We identified the wrong problem. And to be
44:30
fair, in 2003, when all this started, the Chinese were having an internal debate. Should be friends
44:37
with the Americans should be part of the international system or should we go double down on communism? Unfortunately for us, the wrong side won that internal debate in China
44:47
So the luxury we had of being able to spend trillions of dollars on things that don't provide
44:54
strategic advantage disappeared probably about 2010, 2011 when Xi Jinping took office
45:01
So it's been a while and we were slow to react. But if you're going to pick something
45:07
It's like, why haven't we upgraded our forces? And I know the Navy a little bit
45:15
People are worn out. Ships are worn out. Airplanes are worn out
45:20
You need to put that money. We're doing it, but it'll take a while to catch up
45:25
So that's what I'd say is that was probably one of the greatest strategic blunders of
45:32
American history, as we should have about a decade ago said, okay, shift focus, spend the money on
45:38
building strategically competitive forces. And Jim, when you break down that timeline
45:46
I think you said around 2010, 2011 or so, I'm reminded, if I'm not mistaken
45:52
when President Obama ran for re-election against Mitt Romney, a now very famous debate moment
45:58
where essentially both candidates, and this would be, I suppose, 2012, summer of 2012
46:05
asked about biggest global adversarial threats that worries them. Mitt Romney had responded
46:12
Russia, to which President Obama seeking reelection somewhat joked, you know, based on
46:17
paraphrasing here, but basically, you know, the Cold War called and they want their conflict back
46:21
something that now I think we look back at and say, I think even, you know, Democrats and
46:27
Republicans on Capitol Hill would say, you know, Mitt Romney was right in 2011. Would you put the
46:32
same timeline with regards to maybe underestimating or misunderstanding the threat of Russian influence
46:40
at the time? So in, I think it was 2009, 2009, 2010, roughly the same time a little beforehand
46:48
Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference, which is this big annual
46:53
thing and senators go and it's in Munich. And he said, I'll paraphrase for Vlad, he said
47:00
I've had it with those Americans. I'm tired of them telling me what to do. I don't want to live
47:05
in an American globe. I'm going to do my own thing and I'm going to push back. And no one
47:09
paid attention. It turns out he wasn't kidding. And so that's probably a little bit of hubris on
47:18
our part. Russia is not that powerful. I think of Aberdeen, the testing room where they also have
47:24
the armor museum, the tank museum. Think how bad off you'd have to be for us to go and rob the
47:30
armor museum and try and jumpstart an M48 or something because we've run out of tanks. That's
47:37
the position Russia's in. But he made it clear from the start that he, not from the start, but
47:43
He made it clear from 2009 that he'd had it with the American ordered world, the rule of law
47:49
And he found a new friend when Xi Jinping came to power. So we kind of missed that because we assumed that the world was going our way
47:57
And it was then, but it's changed a lot. And I wonder now, as you listen to the current administration grapple with many different
48:08
geopolitical, financial, and other considerations with nations and adversaries around the world
48:13
For instance, the BRICS nations come to mind. Do you hear comparable threats or assertive claims of
48:21
would-be independence from other nations today that similarly make you say, maybe we're not quite taking that modern threat seriously, and perhaps we risk making those same
48:32
mistakes to look back 10 years from now and say, hey, we had those warnings in the 2024-2025 window
48:40
from certain countries? That's a great question. And I'll be think tanky for a minute
48:47
The unipolar moment is over. The moment where America dominated the world is over. It's over
48:52
And we're not going to get it back. It has nothing to do with the current administration
48:56
This was happening probably over the last decade, right? And it says new powers emerge
49:03
You've got Turkey. You've got China. You've got India. You've got Brazil
49:08
And they're not people who played for the most part in World War II. And so they feel like, what do we owe you guys
49:14
You're not our leader. There's not a free world for you to lead
49:19
And so I think that's the issue. Will that turn into a military threat
49:22
will we see a Brazil or an India or Indonesia even, which is a big country, Turkey, they're
49:30
not going to become military threats, but we're going to have to figure out new ways to work with
49:35
them. We're going to have to figure out new ways to make sure they understand the scope of American
49:42
power and move in the same goals, the same direction we'd like. So I think that's a hard
49:47
challenge. It's a different world than it was even under Obama. And this administration is
49:55
doing okay at figuring that out. I think when you listen to them, they know it's not the same world
50:02
But we have a ways to go. I don't worry about the BRICS. I mean, the BRICS
50:06
what is the one thing that unites the BRICS? They don't like the United States. Okay
50:11
not the best foundation for an alliance. If you take China out of the BRICS
50:21
all the other BRICS countries represent 6% of global GDP. They're emerging
50:27
They're powerful. They'll be the powers of the future, but they ain't the powers yet, right
50:32
And most of them don't have very large militaries or any desire to have a war with the US
50:39
So I think we need to rethink how do we get what we want out of this new world, right
50:45
And it's not going to be the things we did 20 years ago. Maybe with, again, an eye to the future, the next five to 10 years or so, Jim, what does
50:54
success look like in all domain operations in the near term future
50:59
You know, I think that that's an experiment that everyone's trying. And so one of the things, to use an example, Xi Jinping recently told Chinese industry
51:12
focus on the applications of AI focus on the applications that AI will make better And that was a really good point I think what happening here is that the U DOD we have all these new things new capabilities
51:26
And some of them are still fairly early in their development. Robots, right
51:33
But think about where robots are compared to where they were five years ago
51:38
How do we pull all this together? How do we find new ways to get advantage
51:42
Same is true on the commercial side. people have to figure out how to use the new technologies to make money. They'll get there
51:50
We have to figure out how to use the new technologies to get military advantage
51:54
in an integrated way, built on the combatant commanders who will be the ones responsible
52:01
I think we can do it, but it's a period of experimentation that, you know, historical
52:07
precedents are always a little dangerous, but it'll take years, years, if carrier aviation
52:13
as an example, a decade, a decade to figure out how to pull this stuff into a coherent
52:20
effective, lethal force, maybe a little quicker now. But that's the challenge is lots of new toys
52:27
How do we play a better game with them? And with those new toys, of course, underscoring the importance of partnerships, the people
52:36
with whom we share the fruits of those new toys, so to speak, how crucial are transatlantic
52:43
partnerships, maybe Indo-Pacific alliances in building that effective all domain force. And
52:49
sort of additionally to that, does any of the rhetoric out of this current administration
52:54
give you concern that maybe the United States today is not willing to establish those partnerships
53:01
and relationships, given the rhetoric that comes from this particular administration with regards to
53:08
maybe having more of a critical eye on the countries with whom we have had
53:12
up until more recently, by all accounts, pretty sound relationships with. So we can split that into two parts. And the first thing I'd say is, if you want to keep an eye on
53:21
this, watch joint exercises. And the BRICS try and copy us and have all their little ships come
53:29
together and try and do something. Joint exercises with allies are the key to this. I was in Korea
53:35
about two weeks ago, and they are very worried, right? Unfortunately, it was the day after we'd
53:41
arrested all their workers in Georgia. Oh, not a popular move. I'm sorry. And they depend on the
53:49
U.S. The U.S. is foundational. What I told them is, look, we're shifting in some ways our focus
53:56
to Asia. And we're shifting to China as our primary opponent. And Japan, Korea, Australia
54:04
can be the foundations of a good defense against China. So figure out how you work. They don't
54:10
want to get caught in the middle. You know, what they said is, look, it's like a mouse between two
54:15
elephants, and you're asking us to pick. And in some ways, they said, yeah, I'm asking you to pick
54:21
us, so make it easier for our allies to work with us. Europe, pardon me, Europe, a different
54:28
situation. They have depended on NATO and the U.S. for decades, and now they're questioning whether
54:36
they can still depend on NATO and the US. And the French, who've always disliked this
54:41
are seeing this as an opportunity to say, let's build an integrated force, let's build an
54:46
integrated defense industry that doesn't include the US, right? That's a worrisome problem. So
54:52
we have to balance the demands of two different sets of allies. I don't think we can just focus
54:58
purely on China, right? We have to figure out how do we deal with the Russians, how do we deal with
55:04
the Chinese and do it in partnerships with the country and the regions. And that leads us back to all the problems of integration
55:12
It's nice if everyone buys the same thing because then you have less of an integration
55:16
problem, but they all have different ships, different tanks, different radars, very limited
55:22
IT capabilities. Pulling that together into an effective force is one of the challenges for the DoD moving forward
55:34
And Jim, finally, if you were advising defense leaders today, what are a few of the top priorities that you think they should focus on to accelerate the move towards this truly integrated, much needed all domain force
55:50
So I'd learned from Ukraine and talking to the Ukrainians, which I've done a few times, it's been really interesting
55:57
They have an acquisition process that makes ours look like a dinosaur
56:04
It is a dinosaur. So what I'd say is speed up acquisitions, make it easier, make it more flexible
56:10
The second thing I'd say is, and this is something we have learned in the past
56:16
create the opportunities for experimentation and tactics and in doctrine. Use that to develop how you will use the new weapon systems
56:28
the new systems that are coming on to deliver lethal effect. So that would be my two things is take a step back and say, how do I streamline acquisitions
56:40
They're already doing that, but they could do more. And then how do I increase the pace of experimentation in the combat arms on an integrated level
56:49
Final thing, bigger picture. Let's people in Washington have figured out and tend to be noisy about the fact that they figured out that China is an opponent
57:00
Russia's an opponent, too. So we are in a fight. It may not be a classic, you know, tanks going through the full-to-gap fight, but we're in a fight with those two. And when we think about how we design an integrated force, how do we design it to beat them
57:17
well that's going to do it and bring us to the end of today's webcast uh i'm very grateful for
57:25
your time jim lewis thanks a lot for taking the time to share your insights to badly needed
57:28
context and perspective it's been great to have you here today thank you jim thank you for having
57:33
me on the show again it was great to be here of course so a huge thanks to jim and of course a big
57:38
thanks to tom knicky for helping frame the conversation as well and of course thanks again
57:42
to Honeywell for supporting the important conversation we had today. I do want to mention
57:47
to everyone watching at home, Defense News will be hosting a series of panel events at AUSA annual
57:52
meeting down in Washington, D.C. We all hope you'll certainly consider attending those events as well
57:58
And if you're interested, you can register at events.defensenews.com slash AUSA. I'm J.D
58:05
Durkin with Defense News. Thanks for taking the time to join us. We'll see you next time
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