Webcast - Building the All-Domain Force

Hello, everyone, and welcome to today's Defense News webcast

I'm J.D. Durkin, a contributor here at Defense News. Today, we're all taking a closer look at one of the most pressing challenges facing U.S

as well as allied forces. And that is, of course, building a truly integrated all-domain force, one across land, air, sea space, and of course, the cyber realms as well

We'll be exploring what is needed to achieve real-time data sharing, trustworthy information, and speed of action in heavily contested environments

Before we dive in, of course, I would like to thank Honeywell for sponsoring today's discussion

And to kick things off, I am joined by Tom Kinnicki. He is the Director of Business Development at Honeywell Aerospace

Tom, good morning. Welcome. Thanks a lot for taking the time. It's great to have you

Good morning. Nice to be here. Thank you for having me. Tom, let's kick things off by taking a closer look at the state of all domain integration today and really the theme being interoperability

That's a word. I know you know it. It's often described as the kind of foundation of an all domain strategy

Tom, where do you most think progress has been made and where do you think the gaps are that still need to be closed

Yeah, it's a great question. You know, from my perspective, you know, 23 years in the military

I've been with Honeywell for eight years now, and I've seen it, you know, throughout both sides of it, both from an industry perspective and from the Air Force perspective

You know, there has been progress, but there is certainly more work to be done

You know, Joint Warfighter Concept 3.0, that's the joint force, that's the guiding document for joint capability requirements in the U.S. military

And we all know interoperability is a buzzword, but, you know, many joint requirements require both interdependency and interoperability

You know, very few domains today are still service specific outside of maybe the undersea domain

For example, most of us know that when the fifth generation aircraft first came online, they were unable to pass targeting data to one another

The Air Force has done a great job since then to solve this issue. But this type of challenge remains at a joint force level within the United States, as well as with our international partners

So you need an architecture, an architecture that can enable any sensor to cue, an architecture that can support any shooter

You know, that is really what's required to realize a true all-domain force

To further elaborate on that, from my perspective, there's still gaps in data standards and the architecture

So, again, we've made some progress, but it's still hindered by inconsistent data formats

There's still a lot of legacy systems out there, many siloed architectures

You know, closing these gaps, this requires a unified digital backbone, and there has to be common standards across the services and among the partner nations

You know, the need for partner nation and industry synchronization is also key as well

You know, true all-domain interoperability, you know, must extend beyond U.S. forces to include coalition partners, industry

You know, we need to accelerate the efforts to align the technologies and the protocols and the operational frameworks to ensure seamless collaboration in contested environments

And I don't want to minimize the level of effort to accomplish everything that I'm just talking about across industry and across nations

It is a monumental task, and it is going to take immense effort on everyone's part to do so

Tom, from your vantage point, where do you see as being some of the biggest challenges that the U.S. as well as the allies, its allies face in building that all domain force? What are those headwinds

Yeah, you know, from again, my perspective, I think policy challenges, you know, based on the various national interests that are out there. You know, for example, AI, you know, the implementation, the policy behind that, trying to pace that with a threat, that's going to present a challenge and continues to present a challenge for us

You know, where does that play? And there's certainly investments that will be required. Maybe one of the larger ones beyond that is the sharing of classified information

You know, enabling coalitions, all domain forces, you know, this requires policy and architecture that permits critical sharing of, for instance, ISR

intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, as well as targeting and threat information. You know, the technology ecosystem remains fragmented

You know, it's one of the biggest challenges in integrating a diverse platform, sensors, and systems across services and the partner nations

You know, many were developed independently, creating interoperability and data sharing hurdles that, as of now, seem to slow down the joint operations

Partner nations also operate under different rules of engagement, different acquisition timelines, different cybersecurity standards

You know, harmonizing these frameworks is essential to establish and enable seamless collaboration for rapid decision making

And then, of course, building an all domain force requires a workforce that's fluent in digital operations

You know, they need to be fluent in AI, cyber warfare. So you've got to recruit, train and retain the talent across the military and the civilian sectors and then foster the culture of jointness within those groups

So those remain persistent challenges to us. Yeah, you mentioned the importance and underscored the importance there of rapid decision making

I think, Tom, that speed of decision making, it is critical, specifically in contested environments

I'm sure you'd agree. How well positioned do you think are allied forces today in order to achieve the kind of real-time data sharing that's actually required

Yeah, you know, this has been a focus area for the U.S. government and for industry and for international partners for a very long time

My last job in the Air Force, I worked in what was called SAFIA, the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs

So we were helping our foreign partners procure U.S. systems primarily, whether it's F-16s, F-15s, weapons, you name it

And a main focus of our area has always been and remains to this day, the ability to achieve real-time data sharing

So it's not just SAFIA, it's their sister implementing agencies like the Navy International Program Office

DASADEC from the Army, DSCA, and Industry Partners. You know, they continue to focus on this real-time data sharing of the issues today

I would say in an unclassified environment, we're actually doing pretty well

in our ability to achieve real-time data sharing. The problem comes when you start getting into the classified realm

when you get secret, top secret, special access, and so on. That's really where we continue to struggle

An example I'll give you, and I won't name the country, but I worked when I was back in Safiyeh

There was a country that was buying F-16s from the U.S. government

But they had previously purchased some Gripen fighters from the country of Sweden And as part of that deal with Sweden Sweden had given what they called their indigenous data link

And then here I roll in a couple of years later selling F-16s

And I say, well, the NATO standard for data link and for us all to be on the same network is called link 16

And this country was hellbent on saying, no, I want to use my indigenous data link

I said, well, there's two problems with that. Problem one is Sweden, who sold that to you, doesn't even use that anymore

They've gone to link 16 as the new standard. And the second problem is that when the joint task force, usually US-led, when that happens

and when that occurs, if you're on a different network, you're not going to be part of

of the team, if you will. You're going to be on a different network. We're not going to see you

you're not going to see us. So you're not going to be involved in the operations as they're unfolding

at least not with the rest of the coalition group. So you're going to be on the outside looking in

You know, and I chalk that up to a few things. You know, part of it might be national pride from

the country. Maybe they just want to have something on their own. In some cases, maybe they don't want

to rely on the US to obtain some of these, the crypto keys, for example, to give them access to

a link 16. And I get that, right? You know, maybe there's a fear the US, maybe the State Department

may roll in and say, you know what, I'm going to sanction your country for this reason, this reason

this reason. Maybe we don't like your stance on human rights. Maybe we didn't appreciate

how you transitioned from your last administration to this current administration. So maybe there's a fear that they're going to have these systems and access to these systems cut off. And again, I get that, and that's fair

There also may be a fear on the other end of it, maybe from the US, maybe because we had talked about this, is it okay for us to ingest some of the data coming from that country system into our system

But there's always a fear that that maybe even might corrupt some of our data

So, you know, at the end of the day, we know what the concepts are. We know what needs to happen

You know, releasability, exportability, those things cannot be ignored. But the capabilities and products to influence and affect interoperability, you know, that still needs to be the focus

And the combined JADC2 that you've heard of for the coalition and senior leader decision making, you know, that's paramount

Yeah, Tom, there's no doubt. It's certainly very much a tough balance between protecting data on the one hand while ensuring accessibility on the other. Talk to me about some of the ways that you most see that. What are the pressing concerns when it comes most to securing and trusting information in this all domain encompassing fight we've been chatting about

You bet. There's several areas we need to consider in the evolving threat landscape, certainly to give ourselves the highest chance of success

One of the most pressing concerns, again, in my opinion, is securing the sensitive data against these evolving threats

As technology advances, so do the tactics used by our adversaries. In an all domain environment where land, sea, air, and cyber, where all those domains intersect, we must be vigilant about who has access to what information

Ensuring that not only authorized personnel can access critical data, that's vital, but we need robust encryption methods to protect the data, whether it's in transit or at rest

Trusting the information that we receive and sharing is a huge concern

In this day and age where misinformation can spread rapidly, especially through the digital channels, we need to ensure the data integrity

And this is actually where one of the emerging technologies that Honeywell is creating, our quantum key distribution of QKD, we call it

That's where this comes into play. You know, our QKD allows us to secure communication channels against interception, making sure the information shared is not only private, but also verifiably trustworthy

And finally, we need to consider the accessibility of this information. In high-stakes situations, people on the ground, they need immediate access to real-time data to make these informed decisions

This means that they have to develop systems that are secure, but user-friendly

Striking that balance is essential. Our teams must be able to rely on information without cumbersome barriers, but it also must be protected against unauthorized access

Tom, I know it can be very difficult to give projections for the landscape of ever-evolving technology, but if you had to take a look at the next five to ten years even, what types of technologies, key innovations do you think may end up making the biggest difference in enabling truly integrated all-domain operations

Great question. I would say my top response here is communication technology

If you can't communicate, you're done. If you lose communications, I suppose the military operator can proceed using commander's intent

But the precise coordination required of future conflicts with coalition partners makes constant and secure communication paramount

For the online-of-sight communications, the U.S. and partner nations continue to espouse their desire to have multiband, multinetwork, multiorbit

They want to have all of those approaches rolled up into a single terminal to communicate, which I think they should be able to achieve in the next five years

But if you look at the next big mover, I would say 10 years down the road or about that, I think you'll see a migration to the 5G non-terrestrial networks, which offer more open protocols for satellite communications

And I think that is going to be a big game changer for all domain operations

Those non-terrestrial networks, they integrate satellite-based communications with the standard 5G networks to provide pervasive global connectivity for areas beyond the reach of traditional cell phone towers

If you look at using low-Earth orbit technologies and satellite networks like Starlink, Starshield, OneWeb, Amazon's Kuiper, Telesat's Lightspeed, Spin Launch's Meridian, you use those along with other airborne platforms

The 5G non-terrestrial network, those will enhance, it will offer enhanced coverage for remote regions supporting emergency services

It's going to enable new Internet of Things applications and direct-to-device satellite connectivity that we just haven't seen

So I think that's going to happen in the next 10 years. That's my prediction

Kenicki is the Director of Business Development at Honeywell Aerospace. Tom, thank you for your context, the much needed perspective and helping us set the stage for our conversation today

Tom, thank you. Thank you again for having me. Folks, don't go anywhere

We will be taking a very short break. And when we return, I will be joined by James Lewis from CSIS to take a closer look into the strategic and policy dimensions of building the all domain force

Stay with us. We see you next time Welcome back everyone I am now joined by James Lewis Senior Advisor at the Center for Strategic

and International Studies. Jim, thanks a lot for taking the time to be here. It is great to have

you join us today. Thank you for having me on the show. So let's start with a look at a bit of the

broader the bigger picture on the conversation when we talk about building an all-domain force

Jim, what is the scope of that challenge today from where you're situated

You know, a good way to think about this in very broad terms is we are in what some people call

a fourth industrial revolution. And it's driven by AI, by semiconductors, by software, and it will

change warfare. That's what we all know. So what I'm looking at, it will be continuous change

That's one of the challenges. So we have to look at a battlefield that'll be populated or driven by electronic warfare, by drones, by robots and automation, by space

So what I see is a very different field emerging and a field where the U.S. has some advantages for a change

So that's a big plus. Jim, how do you actually define the challenge of building an all-domain force? And talk to me a bit about why integration across land, across air, sea, space, and cyber are also difficult

You know, integration goes back at least to World War II when people started to say

you had an army and a navy then, that was it, and they couldn't work with each other

And if you think about Goldwater-Nichols, if you think about all the efforts to get

integrated combatant capabilities, integrated forces, we don't want a purple force. So one of the challenges is the services have unique cultures, and there's benefits to those

cultures. Another issue is the technology. A lot of it comes from the commercial sector

It's built on different standards. It's built not to military specifications. And they have trouble

integrating this stuff in the commercial world. So I don't know why we should be any different

Finally, if you want to complicate the mix even more, throw in allies. Allies are at varying

levels from very low to okay, varying levels of technological sophistication. NATO has been doing

some work on standards. We've done a little work with the Japanese, but it's just, you've inherited

this very complicated situation where new technologies are reshaping how people fight wars

and the side that can figure it out, I do think we have an advantage, but the side that can figure

out how to integrate will do better. Jim, what would you say are some of the largest technical

the bureaucratic, the cultural barriers to achieving actual interoperability across both U.S. and the allied forces you were just referencing there a moment ago

You know, the bureaucratic challenge is for me the biggest challenge, and that challenge would be the acquisition rules

The acquisition rules in the U.S., as they're written now, are an obstacle to progress

It's not the intent. It's well-meaning. But I'd say if we can't figure out how to streamline and accelerate the acquisitions process, that's a serious disadvantage for the US

I was laughing at a piece I saw. It might have been in defense news about how after five years, a prototype satellite would finally enter testing

It's like, five years? Are you kidding me? They don't have five years in Ukraine. So I think that's the biggest one

The cultures are very different, too. And so if you've worked with foreign militaries, Europe essentially disarmed about 35 years ago

They figured, hey, we're going to cash in the peace dividend. And they've got a long way to go

When you look at their sensor capabilities, when you look at their space capabilities, when you look at their EW capabilities

So the varying degrees of sophistication in the allies combined with the problems we have with our acquisition system make integration a hard one

Data, without a doubt, Jim, you know better than most is at the heart of this strategy

What are some of the infrastructure needs to ensure that information can actually flow effectively and seamlessly across different domains

And I would say that people are thinking about that. the U.S. has probably made more progress than any other country. I don't always say that, so this is

a red-letter day for me. You know, one thing we haven't used yet is the word cloud, right? And

cloud is crucial to this because all these, think of this environment populated by all sorts of

devices, all of which are generating information, all of which are coming in to overwhelm the people

at the other end. And that means you need to have secure cloud communication. Cyber security is

important. It means you need to think about the AI tools that will manage this data flow. And AI

you know, whenever you say AI, people immediately flash to the Terminator. This isn't the Terminator

This is how do I aggregate thousands of data streams from different devices in a way that

gives me advantage on the battlefield. Jim, how do you go about measuring or weighing, I should say

the benefits of those tools, those Terminator-type AI tools that people may think of them as

and general machine learning capabilities against the risks that that very same technology may

inherently introduce? Well, so I was at a big IT conference in China, and my Chinese

sponsors had me meet with one of their CAO of a Chinese AI company. And so we were talking

I was interviewing him kind of like this. And I said, well, tell me what you think about risk

What's the risk from AI? And he said something that has stuck with me, even though it's been

years. He said, let's not talk about risk. Let's talk about opportunity. So there's always going to

be risk in new weapons and new ways of fighting. And the question is, how do you manage that risk

in ways that don't cancel the benefits you get. And that's more what I'm worried about

is that if you worry too much about risk, you could lose some of the opportunities

And this is, as you know very well, this is an iterative process

We're gonna build something, it's gonna be okay, but it'll need to change, evolve, fix

And I think if we can stay on top of that iterative process

with the idea in mind that we take advantage of the new technology and use it to build integration across combat capabilities, we'll

do better than our opponents. Jim, I wonder, are there popular misconceptions as it pertains to those very capabilities

Do you see things be frequently misinterpreted? And if so, what are those popular misconceptions about general either interoperability or military

readiness from where you're seated? Well, we won't make fun of Terminator movies

I love them, by the way. I think they're great, but that's one

When you talk to a civilian population, a lot of them who aren't in the defense community

a lot of them flash to killer robots. It like forget it I love robots Would you rather be shot at or have the robot shot at They cool Right But I think some of the misconceptions are this can happen naturally We can just layer it

over the existing system and we will need to make changes. And particularly when you put it in an

alliance context, the idea that there's this seamless interoperability now, we don't have that

now we will have even less of it when we adopt a new technology. So the biggest misconception is

I'd say the biggest misconception is this will be easy. I was thinking about that in preparation for

this call. Where would you put the locus of change? And I decided that it was probably the E5

pardon me, the 05, 06 level. It's the lieutenant colonels and the colonels are going to have to

play with this stuff and figure out how to make it work together. And that might not be what we

think. It might be a DARPA thing too. But the biggest problem is the assumption that interoperability

is easy. There's just, you know, Clausewitz talked about the fog of war and the friction of warfare

Friction applies to interoperability as well. So how do we overcome that

Jim I wonder what keeps you up at night with regards to the conversation you and I are having

oh nothing keeps me up at night well I had teenage kids and that kept me up at night

this is this is nothing compared to teenagers going to the navy yard at two in the morning

but you know what I worry about is uh the Chinese have some advantages right and the it's a

dictatorship. So they can say Xi Jinping, who really cares about this stuff in a way that we

don't always understand, he's sure that AI is going to be the wave of the future. He can say

by the way, I want something new on my desk in two weeks. And if you don't get it, you're going

to be harvesting turnips in Mongolia, if you're lucky. So the advantage that China has in being

able to make decisions in being able to allocate funding. We made a mistake as a government. I was

part of this in, say, 2000. We thought China was going to be our friend. The Chinese thought they

were going to be our friends. And so we let them in. And now they have a very different model that

changed about 10 years ago for them to be competitors and now opponents. So what keeps

new upside is that maybe our system won't be as good as generating outcomes in the near term as

the Chinese. And that's where we need to do some work. Acquisitions is part of that. But so is

strategy and strategic culture. So if I worry about anything, it's it. You know, I'm usually

what I came in at a generation right after when they had this slogan fight outnumbered and win

which I always thought was really dumb, right? But now it's like we are in that situation again

We are outnumbered. The Chinese are as good at generating technology. How do we deal with that

You mentioned Ukraine and that kind of potential five-year window you were a bit skeptical of

earlier in our conversation. And I wonder, as you watch the ongoing conflict in Ukraine

Are there lessons on the ground, either from that conflict, maybe other recent conflicts as well, that you think, Jim, can best be applied to both the United States and its allies in terms of things like integrated warfare and data-driven decision-making that comes across in a very rapid and swift way

You know, the Ukraine, unfortunately, has turned out to be the laboratory of warfare. And that's unfortunate because they're nice people, they deserve better. But they don't have an integration problem as much because they have a very small naval force. Their air force is relatively small

What's come across in the Ukraine thing, and this always isn't obvious, and this is a problem with

Europe, is the infrastructure behind it, the informational infrastructure behind it, the space assets, the intelligence assets, the EW assets, and pulling all those together into

an effective force is a challenge for anyone. Ukraine has real pressure to perform, but Ukraine

could not do what it was doing without that U.S. military information infrastructure behind it

And we need to think, how do we build it out for what our purposes will be? What works in a ground

war in Ukraine may not work in an air-sea battle around Taiwan. So that's the lesson for us is

don't assume things are working. And I know the people in PACOM do not assume things are working

right? They are making a hard effort. But the other thing that amazed me, I met with some

Ukrainian drone companies about a month ago, the pace at which they generate new technology

and the pace at which they generate new solutions, you know, for them, we were kidding about five

years a little while ago. For them, five months would be way too long. So I do worry about that

is that we're so used to being superior that somebody could easily sneak up on us

And the Ukrainians don't have that problem. So those are the lessons for us

Speed, agility, with the word you hear a lot, speed, agility, and integration

How do you think, Jim, that the allied nations should best balance the need on the one hand

for common standards with the realities of procurement systems and defense priorities

What does that sort of intersection look like for you? It looks really grim

And it's not helped by the fact that you now have some of the major countries in Europe, Germany, France, talking about building a defense structure that's free of the U.S. that will undercut integration

You know, it might seem like a good idea politically, but at the end of the day, we're going to have to fight together

You don't see that with the Japanese or the Koreans, that's a plus. So the main thing we need to think about is reinforcing the bureaucratic and political structures that drive towards integration

NATO is the best example, and NATO is actually making some progress here

But European culture, Europe is not defense-oriented. That's changing now as they look over their shoulders and see some guy named Vlad sneaking up on him

But we have to work with countries that don't have as much money, that are way behind in the technology, and are a little bit suspicious of something anymore

So it's the political and bureaucratic obstacles to integration. Once we get those out of the way, that'll be easy

We can start moving to figure out a joint way to fight. And since you mentioned maybe pressure from Russia, in what ways have you watched the European allies either adjust their course or maybe have a shift in conversation the last few years that maybe underscores or puts an example on that shift of priority and focus in Europe

Now, I was talking to someone in Brussels about this very subject, someone connected to the European Union

And they said that three years ago, four years ago, national security was a bad word in Brussels

You didn't want to talk about national security. They didn't want to hear about it

If they talked about building European technology, defense didn't figure into it

That's completely shifted in the last year. Europe now sees defense. They're more worried about it than we are, right

Because they realize how weak they are. So I think the change in Europe, what we have to figure out is, are we going to be part of

that change or are they going to go their own way? And right now, they're undecided

They realize the benefits of working with the U.S., of relying on U.S. defense companies

but they also fear the political consequences of being subservient. So we have a challenge here, but Europe's views on defense have changed

You know, when you get people from Europe telling you, seriously, they're worried about Russian tanks rolling down the Shamsi

they say, I'm not making that up. That's crazy. But they see they're much more intensely threatened by Russia than we are

Maybe we should be. Commercial industry, as you know, it often moves faster in arenas, some of which you've mentioned, things like cloud, cyber, open systems

What changes, Jim, I wonder? What do you think most needs to happen for defense to better leverage those distinct advantages that it already has

You know, when you look at one experiment, I was in the room in 2015 when Ash Carter said he needed to reconnect Silicon Valley and the Pentagon

And the start of that was something called the Defense Innovation Unit. Now many of the services have things like Softworks or AFWERX

you've seen an effort on the part of DOD to generate new ways of doing business that more

closely match what the commercial sector does, that more closely match the investment cycle

DOD has amazing research capabilities and DOD knows what the military problems are. We don't

have the connect, though, to civilian products, commercial products. That's changing for the

better, but it's still a major. Some of it's acquisition rules. I'll keep coming back to that

as an obstacle. Some of it's timing. I'll give you an example that's kind of funny in a sad way

someone I know is the head of a little company that makes technology for space sensors and

military use. And he went to DOD and they told him, fill out these forms and come back in four

months, right? By coincidence, and I assume it was SIGINT, by coincidence, a Chinese investor

showed up, this was a couple of years ago, showed up and said, I can write you a check for $10

million right now. Now, this guy was a patriot. He was Chinese-American, which is interesting

because he said, no thanks. But we have to make people have the opportunity to move quickly

We don't match the commercial sector in speed, in flexibility. And that's our strength as a

country. We need to figure out how to bring more of that to DOD. You mentioned China. How does China's approach to integration compare with the US and its allies and the challenges the US faces

The Chinese continue to struggle with integration, and you can see it because they continue to reorganize. They haven't found a good fit yet. And they're thinking about how do I combine space, cyber with the traditional forms of military power

But they have problems. The first problem is inexperience. Like someone said to me, the Chinese are building all these new weapons

And it's like, yeah, but they haven't been tested in combat. China has never been in combat

The last war they were in was with Vietnam, and they lost that in about two weeks

So inexperience is a problem for China. If you don't know what the problems are, how do you design solutions for them

And one way, of course, is the Chinese closely track what the U.S. is doing

The second problem they have is corruption. When was the last time we had multiple generals fired for corruption

I can't even remember it. I can't even think of an example. So corruption is part of the Chinese system

And that means maybe they can't trust the stuff they're getting. So it's the lack of experience

Someone, a friend of mine at Georgetown, sent me a picture, posted a picture of the Chinese testing their carrier

carrier takeoff. And he noted that nothing else was on the deck. It's not like a U.S. carrier

where it's busy and everyone's moving around and they have colored T-shirts. The Chinese had to

clear the decks to test the singular. That's not how it works in warfare. So they do have this

advantage, though, of Xi Jinping does not have to worry about getting congressional approval

He doesn't have to worry about lawyers. He doesn't have to worry about saying

I have to balance the budget. He can just say, this is what we need to do

So on the one side, the advantage is being an autocrat. On the other side, corruption and inexperience

So on the whole, the Chinese are much better than we give them credit for usually

They really are a peer. And that's going to be a challenge for the U.S. if we don't pick up our pace

On the flip side of that ysis, Jim, I wonder what are the advantages the U.S. may have given how our system is, that we do have democratic elections as frequently as we do, that Congress, not the president, according to the Constitution, is responsible for waging and engaging in warfare, that our elected officials do have additional concerns, budgetary, fiscal policy, and others, that maybe on the surface may seem as a result

additional roadblocks that some of our adversaries don't have. But are there advantages

that that allows for the United States, I wonder? Yeah, I think we do have an advantage. And

it's maybe a little obscured right now. But if you talk to people in both House and Senate

they'll tell you, you know, what gets the attention are the big spats and the disputes

And there's some members who love going on social media and saying outrageous things. But

In general, they work together. They have a sense of what the common good is

I hope we can rebuild the old, remember, politics stops at the water's edge, and national security is a bipartisan thing

We kind of damage that by the failures in Afghanistan and Iraq

You can lose two wars and not expect there to be political turmoil But underneath that there still this consensus And so if we can figure out a way that is possible to hook the engine of American innovation to

defense needs, we'll pull ahead of China. And I think I'm kind of an optimistic. The real issue

the real question is when. And some people say China's going to invade Taiwan in 2027

And that'll depend on the signals we send them. But we managed to fall behind. We're behind. We're outgunned. We're outnumbered. They have better missiles. They have better drones. That's not a good thing. They have more ships

If they give us a couple years, we can catch up. That's what I worry about is that the advantages that the U.S. has, the innate advantages that the U.S. has will take some time to pull together, and hopefully we'll get that time

Jim, since we're mentioning policymakers here in the United States and in Washington, D.C., I wonder, are they prone to misconceptions

And if so, what are those biggest misconceptions that you see among our policymakers or even members of the public about an all-domain force and all-domain operations

You know, an all-domain, I think it's – you haven't seen a movie about an all-domain force

You may never see a movie about an all-domain force, in part because it's not as dramatic, right

It's not going to be Top Gun. But in some ways, that's what you have in front of you is the ability to conceptualize what all-domain warfare looks like

what pooling together an integrated force, an integrated ability to deliver effect will look like

And I think that one of the misconceptions is a concept, this is more true in the previous administration, that we're so far ahead of China, we don't have to worry about it

We're not ahead of China. They're a peer. Another misconception is that the progress we've made in building an integrated force is adequate for the new challenges that the new technologies will bring

And that's not true either. We have to go to a period of experimentation in organization and strategy and doctrine

And that's always tough. In the past, experimentation has been driven by the pressure of combat, right

When you're being shot at, suddenly a lot of the other obstacles fall away

We aren't there yet. Hopefully we won't get there, but we've got to figure out how do we pick up the pace to

improve integration. I would focus on the combatant commanders. At the end of the day, they're the guys. They already have to integrate. They've got naval, air, land, cyber components that they already have to integrate. So let's see what the combatant commanders would say for building a more effective integrated force

Jim, when you listen to lawmakers in Washington talk about China, it has become at times very much a badge of honor, I would argue, for a member of Congress, regardless of his or her political party, to be known as a hawk on China, to speak very tough with regards to the rhetoric on Beijing, and not to needlessly get into the politics of it

But I wonder, as you listen to proposed solutions and the rhetoric from our policymakers in Washington, do you feel as if the tone, the temperature with which our policymakers talk about Beijing is at least guided in the right direction and therefore what's left to debate are simply the nuances of the execution itself

Or do you feel as if maybe, you know, in the rush to do things like cable news interviews and social media clips, like you said earlier, that maybe even some of our most important voices on Capitol Hill may misconstrue some of the most important things to keep in mind

So for those of you who played on a sports team, criticizing the other team does not score points, right

And so what I worry about is we need to think about what is it that will put the U.S. ahead

You know, China bad. Got it. And I know they have to say that. And it's a lot of fun

But it doesn't actually address the integration problems, the innovation problems, the research

problems that we have as a country. We're doing OK. I think one benefit is we're on the defensive

And it's easier to be the defender, right? But we took our eye off the ball for many years

And the Chinese are now ahead of us. So I'd rather have people tell me, it's like, okay, visas

You want to charge for visas, HB2 or HB1 or whatever, H1B, I beg your pardon

Go ahead, charge. But where's the accompanying program to create the American tech force that we'll need, right

It's not there. We used to have it. We had it in the Eisenhower administration

We need to do that again. So TikTok is not that scary to me because if you're a Chinese spy, your primary target is not going to be a bunch of lip syncing teenagers

Maybe they have an influence campaign. Some people believe they do. Where's our counter to what the Chinese are doing

So what I worry about with this debate is it's easy to say China bad. It's easy to describe the problem

But I think we ought to pay a little more attention to what are the solutions

This administration, to its credit, and I don't usually give them credit, but to its credit, they figured out some of the problems

They figured out when you look at the efforts on acquisitions, when you look at the effort on integration of forces, they're doing okay

You know, not fast enough, but that's a different solution. That's a different way to look at it

Don't tell me China's a problem. Tell me how you're going to counter it

also i do say i'll just say this thing people say we have to beat china in the race what does that

mean does that mean we get we cross the finish line first where is the finish line so let's this

is a long-term conflict we need to think long-term and i don't hear enough of that you know if one

more person tells me we have to beat china in the ai race what does that even mean but if you see it

on the battlefield you know we're winning you mentioned there you mentioned a moment ago jim

The United States proverbially here taking its eye off the ball with regards to China

Could you help diagnose for me a little bit how and when that happened

Do you look back at relatively recent U.S. history? Not to ask you to assign blame to one administration or another, but at what point do you think did that calculus change where the U.S. is now went from looking over its shoulder to realizing should have maybe been paying a little bit closer attention over several key years

So the numbers fluctuate a little bit but we spent trillion in the war on terror trillion And if we devoted even a fraction of that to forced modernization to new technology

we would be much better off. So it was a strategic failure. We identified the wrong problem. And to be

fair, in 2003, when all this started, the Chinese were having an internal debate. Should be friends

with the Americans should be part of the international system or should we go double down on communism? Unfortunately for us, the wrong side won that internal debate in China

So the luxury we had of being able to spend trillions of dollars on things that don't provide

strategic advantage disappeared probably about 2010, 2011 when Xi Jinping took office

So it's been a while and we were slow to react. But if you're going to pick something

It's like, why haven't we upgraded our forces? And I know the Navy a little bit

People are worn out. Ships are worn out. Airplanes are worn out

You need to put that money. We're doing it, but it'll take a while to catch up

So that's what I'd say is that was probably one of the greatest strategic blunders of

American history, as we should have about a decade ago said, okay, shift focus, spend the money on

building strategically competitive forces. And Jim, when you break down that timeline

I think you said around 2010, 2011 or so, I'm reminded, if I'm not mistaken

when President Obama ran for re-election against Mitt Romney, a now very famous debate moment

where essentially both candidates, and this would be, I suppose, 2012, summer of 2012

asked about biggest global adversarial threats that worries them. Mitt Romney had responded

Russia, to which President Obama seeking reelection somewhat joked, you know, based on

paraphrasing here, but basically, you know, the Cold War called and they want their conflict back

something that now I think we look back at and say, I think even, you know, Democrats and

Republicans on Capitol Hill would say, you know, Mitt Romney was right in 2011. Would you put the

same timeline with regards to maybe underestimating or misunderstanding the threat of Russian influence

at the time? So in, I think it was 2009, 2009, 2010, roughly the same time a little beforehand

Vladimir Putin gave a speech at the Munich Security Conference, which is this big annual

thing and senators go and it's in Munich. And he said, I'll paraphrase for Vlad, he said

I've had it with those Americans. I'm tired of them telling me what to do. I don't want to live

in an American globe. I'm going to do my own thing and I'm going to push back. And no one

paid attention. It turns out he wasn't kidding. And so that's probably a little bit of hubris on

our part. Russia is not that powerful. I think of Aberdeen, the testing room where they also have

the armor museum, the tank museum. Think how bad off you'd have to be for us to go and rob the

armor museum and try and jumpstart an M48 or something because we've run out of tanks. That's

the position Russia's in. But he made it clear from the start that he, not from the start, but

He made it clear from 2009 that he'd had it with the American ordered world, the rule of law

And he found a new friend when Xi Jinping came to power. So we kind of missed that because we assumed that the world was going our way

And it was then, but it's changed a lot. And I wonder now, as you listen to the current administration grapple with many different

geopolitical, financial, and other considerations with nations and adversaries around the world

For instance, the BRICS nations come to mind. Do you hear comparable threats or assertive claims of

would-be independence from other nations today that similarly make you say, maybe we're not quite taking that modern threat seriously, and perhaps we risk making those same

mistakes to look back 10 years from now and say, hey, we had those warnings in the 2024-2025 window

from certain countries? That's a great question. And I'll be think tanky for a minute

The unipolar moment is over. The moment where America dominated the world is over. It's over

And we're not going to get it back. It has nothing to do with the current administration

This was happening probably over the last decade, right? And it says new powers emerge

You've got Turkey. You've got China. You've got India. You've got Brazil

And they're not people who played for the most part in World War II. And so they feel like, what do we owe you guys

You're not our leader. There's not a free world for you to lead

And so I think that's the issue. Will that turn into a military threat

will we see a Brazil or an India or Indonesia even, which is a big country, Turkey, they're

not going to become military threats, but we're going to have to figure out new ways to work with

them. We're going to have to figure out new ways to make sure they understand the scope of American

power and move in the same goals, the same direction we'd like. So I think that's a hard

challenge. It's a different world than it was even under Obama. And this administration is

doing okay at figuring that out. I think when you listen to them, they know it's not the same world

But we have a ways to go. I don't worry about the BRICS. I mean, the BRICS

what is the one thing that unites the BRICS? They don't like the United States. Okay

not the best foundation for an alliance. If you take China out of the BRICS

all the other BRICS countries represent 6% of global GDP. They're emerging

They're powerful. They'll be the powers of the future, but they ain't the powers yet, right

And most of them don't have very large militaries or any desire to have a war with the US

So I think we need to rethink how do we get what we want out of this new world, right

And it's not going to be the things we did 20 years ago. Maybe with, again, an eye to the future, the next five to 10 years or so, Jim, what does

success look like in all domain operations in the near term future

You know, I think that that's an experiment that everyone's trying. And so one of the things, to use an example, Xi Jinping recently told Chinese industry

focus on the applications of AI focus on the applications that AI will make better And that was a really good point I think what happening here is that the U DOD we have all these new things new capabilities

And some of them are still fairly early in their development. Robots, right

But think about where robots are compared to where they were five years ago

How do we pull all this together? How do we find new ways to get advantage

Same is true on the commercial side. people have to figure out how to use the new technologies to make money. They'll get there

We have to figure out how to use the new technologies to get military advantage

in an integrated way, built on the combatant commanders who will be the ones responsible

I think we can do it, but it's a period of experimentation that, you know, historical

precedents are always a little dangerous, but it'll take years, years, if carrier aviation

as an example, a decade, a decade to figure out how to pull this stuff into a coherent

effective, lethal force, maybe a little quicker now. But that's the challenge is lots of new toys

How do we play a better game with them? And with those new toys, of course, underscoring the importance of partnerships, the people

with whom we share the fruits of those new toys, so to speak, how crucial are transatlantic

partnerships, maybe Indo-Pacific alliances in building that effective all domain force. And

sort of additionally to that, does any of the rhetoric out of this current administration

give you concern that maybe the United States today is not willing to establish those partnerships

and relationships, given the rhetoric that comes from this particular administration with regards to

maybe having more of a critical eye on the countries with whom we have had

up until more recently, by all accounts, pretty sound relationships with. So we can split that into two parts. And the first thing I'd say is, if you want to keep an eye on

this, watch joint exercises. And the BRICS try and copy us and have all their little ships come

together and try and do something. Joint exercises with allies are the key to this. I was in Korea

about two weeks ago, and they are very worried, right? Unfortunately, it was the day after we'd

arrested all their workers in Georgia. Oh, not a popular move. I'm sorry. And they depend on the

U.S. The U.S. is foundational. What I told them is, look, we're shifting in some ways our focus

to Asia. And we're shifting to China as our primary opponent. And Japan, Korea, Australia

can be the foundations of a good defense against China. So figure out how you work. They don't

want to get caught in the middle. You know, what they said is, look, it's like a mouse between two

elephants, and you're asking us to pick. And in some ways, they said, yeah, I'm asking you to pick

us, so make it easier for our allies to work with us. Europe, pardon me, Europe, a different

situation. They have depended on NATO and the U.S. for decades, and now they're questioning whether

they can still depend on NATO and the US. And the French, who've always disliked this

are seeing this as an opportunity to say, let's build an integrated force, let's build an

integrated defense industry that doesn't include the US, right? That's a worrisome problem. So

we have to balance the demands of two different sets of allies. I don't think we can just focus

purely on China, right? We have to figure out how do we deal with the Russians, how do we deal with

the Chinese and do it in partnerships with the country and the regions. And that leads us back to all the problems of integration

It's nice if everyone buys the same thing because then you have less of an integration

problem, but they all have different ships, different tanks, different radars, very limited

IT capabilities. Pulling that together into an effective force is one of the challenges for the DoD moving forward

And Jim, finally, if you were advising defense leaders today, what are a few of the top priorities that you think they should focus on to accelerate the move towards this truly integrated, much needed all domain force

So I'd learned from Ukraine and talking to the Ukrainians, which I've done a few times, it's been really interesting

They have an acquisition process that makes ours look like a dinosaur

It is a dinosaur. So what I'd say is speed up acquisitions, make it easier, make it more flexible

The second thing I'd say is, and this is something we have learned in the past

create the opportunities for experimentation and tactics and in doctrine. Use that to develop how you will use the new weapon systems

the new systems that are coming on to deliver lethal effect. So that would be my two things is take a step back and say, how do I streamline acquisitions

They're already doing that, but they could do more. And then how do I increase the pace of experimentation in the combat arms on an integrated level

Final thing, bigger picture. Let's people in Washington have figured out and tend to be noisy about the fact that they figured out that China is an opponent

Russia's an opponent, too. So we are in a fight. It may not be a classic, you know, tanks going through the full-to-gap fight, but we're in a fight with those two. And when we think about how we design an integrated force, how do we design it to beat them

well that's going to do it and bring us to the end of today's webcast uh i'm very grateful for

your time jim lewis thanks a lot for taking the time to share your insights to badly needed

context and perspective it's been great to have you here today thank you jim thank you for having

me on the show again it was great to be here of course so a huge thanks to jim and of course a big

thanks to tom knicky for helping frame the conversation as well and of course thanks again

to Honeywell for supporting the important conversation we had today. I do want to mention

to everyone watching at home, Defense News will be hosting a series of panel events at AUSA annual

meeting down in Washington, D.C. We all hope you'll certainly consider attending those events as well

And if you're interested, you can register at events.defensenews.com slash AUSA. I'm J.D

Durkin with Defense News. Thanks for taking the time to join us. We'll see you next time