Advancing Collective Security in the Indo-Pacific

in the event of an unintentional move

to be able to back away and de-escalate than I am confident in our ability

to actually effectively counter the adversary if they decide to escalate intentionally

And I think that the danger is our adversaries will often try and make it look like

we're the ones provoking the situation or that the way the situation is developing

risks spiraling out of control to cause us to hesitate. And so it's that perception of accidental escalation, accidental move to conflict that our adversaries leverage against us to be able to achieve their end. That's what I'm concerned about

Yeah. And just to add to that, I do agree that Beijing's actions have set the stage for potentially intentional escalation given their, for example, their recent exercises where they're increasingly exercising paramilitary forces in the gray zone and using their Coast Guard to control the air and maritime space around Taiwan

And these are all, you know, observable indicators of something like potentially a soft quarantine type situation where the burden of escalation then would fall on the United States and allies and partners, for example, because if China decides to start restricting imports into Taiwan or restricting the airspace or maritime space around Taiwan, it becomes very challenging to know how to respond without escalating that into an armed conflict

and Beijing is well aware of that. So I do think that that is also, by the way

a risky situation for China to get itself into as well, because if we do end up confronting it

then it could end up in an armed conflict. But I do worry that Beijing might decide

that the risk is acceptable to do something like that. And then we are in a situation of, you know

trying to figure out what to do without escalating this into a broader conflict

Yeah, if I could just add, So whenever we think about unintentional or accidental or, you know, maybe even intentional conflict erupting between the U.S. and China, we think about, of course, the Taiwan Strait, rightly so

But we shouldn't forget about the challenges in the South China Sea

And, you know, I tend to worry a lot about that area because China is, you know, challenging the Philippines more and more

And we've seen even recent incidents of provocations, shooting water cannons at Philippines vessels

And it seems like it's only a matter of time. We've already seen a Philippines service member being injured in one of these acts of coercion or gray zone actions, which we often call what China is doing, you know, provoking a situation, escalating a situation just below what would cause a military response to its actions

But I think it's a matter of time before we see perhaps a Philippine service member getting killed in one of these incidents

And then what happens? Does the mutual defense treaty between the United States and the Philippines get invoked

How involved does the U.S. get? And so I think that that's what worries me the most is getting into some kind of confrontation with China over their provocations of the Philippines in the South China Sea

I wonder for all three of you, are you all in the camp who currently believe that deterrence in the region is working

Are we on borrowed time? Is it maybe a combination of both of those possibilities

I think we're on borrowed time. And actually, one of the most important piece of ysis I think we've produced in my team recently was titled Deterrence is Crumbling, How We Can Fix It

And it is crumbling around the edges. The danger is we focus so much on deterring full scale, both from the blue conflict

We focus on deterring nuclear escalation to the point of being concerned about mutually assured destruction

And what we're failing to deter is this creeping normalcy of our adversaries more and more doing things that 10 years ago we would have considered unacceptable crossing of red lines

When I think about the number of times that we've seen in recent years one of those three adversaries do something that previously would have been the spark for war that now has just become the new normal

Look at the level of incursions, the level of the violence, the aggression that's going on in Europe right now

these all suggest that deterrence is crumbling from the bottom up, right

And what's more problematic is that we have come to confuse, I think, war avoidance with deterrence

So the idea that we want to avoid war with China, I think that's certainly something that we want to do

But we want to avoid that war by deterring them from continuing to escalate their aggression

rather than continuing to turn the other cheek and to allow them to get their victory without fighting

Because at the end of the day, the PRC doesn't want to war with the United States either

They don't want to war with Taiwan. They want to win without fighting. They want a surrender. And so deterring that sort of creeping aggression is a fundamentally different mindset, I think

than deterring a full-scale war or a nuclear exchange. Yeah. And so the same question for Kristen and Lisa

And in addition, what have been a lot of those same contributing factors globally over the last few years, to Marcus's point, of that status quo to begin to be chipped away at

Well, I'd say part of what deters China is whether China believes that the U.S. will have access to certain capabilities in other countries during conflict

And so, Rand, I just led a study. It's on our website if anyone's available on, if anyone's interested, on conflict phase access in Asia and improving that

And so, you know, it is an issue in terms of anything that we do with other countries in terms of capabilities that we end up being able to put there, signals that we send for interoperability with other militaries

something like the, the renegotiation of the EDCA agreement in the Philippines is very important

for example, because it does signal that the U S would not only have increased locations where it could access material and other things but also increased access in the event of a conflict

So I think these are things that enhance deterrence. And the flip side of that is that Beijing also watches very carefully conversations that we have with allies

where capabilities do not get placed in a country. And so, you know, some of the conversations with Japan, for example, about some of the more offensive capabilities that were being discussed that did not happen, those are conversations that Beijing watches very carefully

And all of this goes into that risk assessment about deterrence. So I would just bring that up as sort of a broader regional conversation and trend that has happened between the United States and its allies

I think there are many aspects to deterrence, and some, I think, are going better than others

I think, you know, the Trump administration is investing in U.S. defense

You know, they're devoting more capabilities to shipbuilding, the defense industrial base

So we see a lot of good things happening that will help enhance deterrence in the Indo-Pacific

But the other part of deterrence, I think, does involve working closely with our allies and partners

And if we look at initiatives like AUKUS, which, of course, was initiated during the Biden administration

this is the agreement to work with Australia and the UK to provide Australian nuclear-powered submarines

to be able to enable Australia to play a greater role in deterring China

and allowing the U.S. more facilities to be able to operate from

So AUKUS very much contributes to deterrence. We don't know what the future of AUKUS will be

We know it's under review at the Pentagon. Hopefully there's enough support in Congress and there has been enough investment

Australia has already invested $800 million in helping the U.S. defense industrial base

So, you know, the initiative has already moved forward, you know, beyond, you know, almost beyond the point of no return

So I think we will, you know, see it continue, but it may take on a different shape or form or different timelines

So that's one example of, you know, we don't know, you know, I think, you know, Marcus is right

It has been chipped away, but there's still an opportunity for this second Trump administration to enhance deterrence and to build up those alliances and partnerships in Asia

And then the third thing I would raise is the way or the quality of deterrence we have in the Indo-Pacific will be influenced by how the Russia-Ukraine war ends

And if Ukraine is not supported, if it has to give up large parts of its territory, Russia sort of wins or gambled correctly in invading Ukraine

That is going to send a very bad signal to the rest of the world, to our adversaries and to countries like China when it comes to Taiwan

So I think it matters how the war in Russia ends. And it can't be that Ukraine is thrown under the bus and not supported because that will actually degrade deterrence in other parts of the world

Yeah. And Lisa, I'm glad you mentioned AUKUS. And truly, you have an administration now, and not the first presidency to do this, that are willing to go back to the drawing board and look at the work of their predecessors and better determine, do we continue on this path forward or do we adjust course

And I think right now maybe we're seeing an administration a bit more open about their willingness to examine policies from past White Houses

And I wonder in the space of geopolitics and the conversation we're having, do you view that as a benefit in that it allows the United States to stay agile

Or do you view that as maybe a bit of a detriment in that it dramatically takes us off course that a previous White House had just put us on

Yeah, I think that AUKUS is a great place to start because the focus on AUKUS in terms of the public messaging and the way it first was unrolled, unveiled, was on Pillar One, the submarine program, which you just emphasized

And that's a very, very long time frame. It's something that would require sustained investment and commitment over the course of multiple administrations to build out the ability to produce the submarines

Huge investments and the submarines get to the point where Australia can produce them a long time from now

In the interim steps, of course, establishing a joint submarine task force in Western Australia with U.S. and U.K. submarines

Perhaps that's the most near term thing that this is going to accomplish. But what's actually more important about AUKUS, not to denigrate the submarines, is Pillar 2

And that includes developing eight different categories of capability jointly among the three countries

and then potentially even bringing in other partners as part of these Pillar 2 projects

We're talking about things like hypersonic missiles, quantum computing, anti-submarine warfare, unmanned vehicles

And these are the sorts of things that can be fielded in months or years, not things that are going to come a decade or more

And it's that kind of agility, it's that kind of ability to find opportunities to invest and to field capability in the near term

That's going to be decisive, much more so than whether or not we stick to the Pillar 1 plan with the submarines

And so this idea of applying that principle of what Pillar 2 has to offer for AUKUS to things like the PIPER, Indo-Pacific Industrial Defense Industry Cooperation, other ad hoc things that we can develop over time, that's what's going to get us to the place where we're going to be able to stay ahead of the PRC in terms of capability, build these capabilities flexibly with our allies

Understanding it's not a one-size-fits-all, right? Every ally, every partner has different priorities

different resources, different risk calculus, but it's that agility and the sense of urgency

that's absolutely vital. And I think pillar two is a great example of an underutilized mechanism that we can use to really move out urgently with our allies and partner For Sure A question for all of you and maybe Kristen you happy to take this next one What makes U military aid in the Indo different from let say aid that we see

administered in parts of Europe or the Middle East? So I think U.S. military aid in the Indo-Pacific

has rightly so largely focused on defensive capabilities, and it's focused on

enhancing our allied and partner military forces. We've used a lot of things like exercises

We've had, you know, in the Philippines, we've had rotational deployments. The Typhon missile

deployment is a great example of something like that. And I think there's been a lot of focus also

on helping Southeast Asian countries maybe work together a little bit more. And I think that is

a good thing. You know, as we talk about things like countering China and the gray zone

capabilities such as enhanced ISR, maritime domain awareness, some of the capabilities and

the discussions that we've had, cyber issues, are common concerns and issues that countries in

Southeast Asia are willing to work together on. And the more we can foster that cohesion, I think

the better off we'll be. So that's been a theme in that area

Yeah. I wonder, another open question for all of you, do you feel as if we are doing enough to

tailor, to kind of customize our assistance to partners, even if those partners have very

different or differing levels of capability? I think we are. And I think Congress has a big

say in this, and I'll come back to the House Foreign Operations and Appropriations Act

rather than saying appropes. And in that, we see that they are recommending tripling assistance for

maritime security activities. And this is something where we can really cooperate closely

with the Southeast Asian Oceans. We have a mutual interest in wanting to increase their maritime

domain awareness so that they can know what's happening and monitoring their own

shores and economic zones, their eases, and also strengthening their maritime patrol activities

through training and cooperation. So I do think that the U.S. does a pretty good job in tailoring

its assistance for other countries through foreign military financing activities. And I think this is extremely important when it comes to the South China Sea and these areas that are major global shipping, transit areas that impact global trade

So I think in the case of Southeast Asia, I think the U.S. is doing a pretty good job of tailoring its military assistance to these countries

Marcus, Kristen? Yeah, I think this idea of tailoring is really vital

and I alluded to that in my previous answer, but I think it must also come along with an

understanding of not just the capabilities of the individual partners, but their level of political

will, their alignment, their goals, and their priorities. And so when I hear Southeast Asia

it's such a homogenous region, and there's such a spectrum of alignment there. And on one end

you've got a U.S. treaty ally, the Philippines, that is under attack on a daily basis. I was

there in Manila not long ago, and they're under attack by the PRC. It's very clear. It's not

showing up enough in our media, to be quite honest. And they are desperately in need of

support from the United States. They have the will. They just don't have the resources and

the capability. Then on the other end of the spectrum, and I won't name specific countries

but there are countries in ASEAN that are essentially mouthpieces for China

And these are countries that, yeah, it would be great to try and change their alignment and try

and work with them. And then there's countries, you know, on different elements of the spectrum in between that are concerned about their sovereignty but also don't want to antagonize

the PRC. And so a lot of our tailoring needs to be really focused on supporting those that are

most under attack and desperately in need of help and not considering Southeast Asia as just

one category. There's just such a huge difference between the countries in Southeast Asia. And then

also, to be quite honest, I think we need to recognize that our allies in Northeast Asia

need help and Taiwan needs help. And recognize even though Japan and South Korea are wealthy

and Taiwan's wealthy, it doesn't mean that they don't also need assistance as well. And they are

of course, you know, I think much more focused on confronting the threat from the adversary

than some of the countries in Southeast Asia. Yeah, I'd love to ask you a bit more about our

regional alliances and the state of our overall partnerships. Chris, you're welcome to take this

or anyone up here. How much of a force multiplier is the quad, that crucial relationship between the

U.S., Japan, India, of course, and Australia in real terms. What does this look like from where you're positioned

I don't know if it would be considered a force multiplier, but I certainly think it's been an opportunity for more regional cooperation

And, you know, the Quad has mainly focused on sort of medical assistance and things like that

and they've done a few exercises. They were talking about doing maritime domain awareness exercises

and that sort of got China up in arms a little bit about it. But it's interesting, though, if you look at China's response to the Quad, a lot of times, like if there are exercises done or something like that, China won't directly respond to the Quad, but it will respond bilaterally by, you know, saying something to India or, you know, doing an exercise over by Japan or something like that

And so I think, you know, China does notice what we do with the Quad

It notices also what we don't do if we're not doing a lot with it. But I think these types of regional organizations are also, the more robust they are and the more concerning they are to China because that sort of heralds the creation potentially in their minds of an anti-China coalition

And that's something that China has really tried to mitigate and avoid through economic incentives and other types of carrots, along with balancing, as Mark has talked about, with the countries in Southeast Asia that are sort of already on the fence or non-aligned

So if I can jump in I think the co is extremely important Even though it not a military alliance the four countries you know have a lot in common their maritime powers their democracies They want to see you know a balance

of power in Asia. They don't want to see China as the hegemon in Asia. And so they can work together

to shape the Indo-Pacific region. And they have been doing this in many ways. And even though

they're not a military alliance. They are doing more and more on the maritime security realm

You have the Indo-Pacific Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative, the IPMDA, which was

initiated during the Biden administration, but has been continued. And there was a commitment

to continue these kinds of activities by the Trump administration. I will mention that it was

the first Trump administration that revived the Quad after a 10-year hiatus in 2017. I was

senior director at the National Security Council when this happened, and there was, you know

a lot of investment in the Quad. Now, of course, the Biden administration sort of took it to the

next level, instituting summits, annual summits of the Quad. And, you know, we are hoping to see

another Quad Summit in November in India. However, when I started off my remarks

unfortunately, the U.S.-India relationship has deteriorated. And if you don't have India in the

Quad, you simply don't have the Quad. India is an integral part of the Quad grouping. So I do hope

that the Trump administration acknowledges how important India is because of the Quad

and the kind of deterrence that that does offer in the region

by getting these four powerful maritime democracies together and cooperating on different initiatives

So I'll leave it at that. Amazing. Lisa, I know you're short on time, so we're just going to do another moment or two

So one final question for all of you, and I'll start at the end. What do you think strategic success looks like in the relationship between the U.S. and the Indo-Pacific region, even over the course of the next 10 years

Yeah, I think that's a very broad question for the last one

But I would say it looks like something where Southeast Asia can have its independence and can thrive, where the United States is still a forcible presence there

but where the United States and China have worked things out to a point where, you know, we don't end up in armed conflict

And I mean, it is, you know, Taiwan is the obvious thorn in the side

It is a big issue and a big challenge. But I do continue to believe that, you know, if we maintain the status quo, if we enhance deterrence

if we work with our allies and partners, that we can come to a place of stability

that the countries that are in the region can thrive. Marcus? So I think success looks like an interlocking web

based on the primary U.S. allies in the region but an increasing number of partners

that are willing to work together to counter increasing aggression, particularly by China but by the other adversaries I mentioned

And that web includes not just diplomatic support not just economic relationships, but also an increasingly interconnected defense industrial base

an increasing willingness and ability to work together to counter in the information domain

the counterintimidation, to encounter, to counter, I should say, the threats and the undermining of those mutual relationships

preventing China from peeling off individual countries and, as you mentioned, hitting them bilaterally

Right. And that ultimately that the deterrence is strengthened not just against a PRC invasion of Taiwan or, you know, North Korean strikes against South Korea, et cetera, but that the deterrence is strengthened against these more coercive gray zone, limited type military and coercive actions

That that's what success looks like a web basically to roll that sort of that sort of aggression back

Amazing. And finally. Yeah, I would just say, number one, of course, avoiding conflict in the region

Two is to have the U.S. positively and strongly engaged in the region, investing economically, having strong productive trade relationships

And, you know, keeping the seaways free and open, working with other countries to make sure that the seaways are free and open

And then lastly, that each country in the region can protect its own sovereignty, that they're not subject to economic or military coercion

To me, that would be success. All right. Put our hands together and give it up for our wonderful panelists who kicked off today's programming

Lisa Curtis, Marcus Garlaskis and Christine Dunnis at the end. Thank you all so much

All right. You can head out that way. all right thank you and thank you all we're off to a great start aren't we here

all right folks well a little bit of progress so this is what it's like when you do live

programming things change we do this on the news broadcast side and it happens here as well

as of late yesterday evening as we were all on our way here to washington we were fully prepared

to launch into a series of really crucial discussions on army modernization at this

point in the program. That at least had been the plan. Unfortunately, the next few scheduled

speakers have since been advised by the Office of the Secretary of Defense that they can no longer

participate, which is unfortunate. We do look forward to having a good faith, constructive

conversation with them at some point about the depth, the nuances, the importance of all these

geopolitical challenges. And the same, unfortunately, goes for some programming with regards to the

Marine Corps, who are unable to be here as of this morning. Certainly regrettable overall. However

we remain committed to pressing forward for the day's programming. And the good news for all of you is since you already sat through one panel

coffee has been refreshed, as has some snacks. We're going to take about a 20, 25 minute break

We'll be back with more programming after this. Thank you, everyone